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Lawmaking bodies in one polity sometimes incorporate the law of another 
polity “dynamically,” so that when the law of the foreign jurisdiction changes, 
the law of the incorporating jurisdiction changes automatically.  Dynamic in-
corporation can save lawmaking costs, lead to better legal rules and standards, 
and solve collective action problems.  Thus, the phenomenon is widespread.  
Dynamic incorporation does, however, delegate lawmaking power.  Further, as 
the formal and practical barriers to revocation of the act of dynamic incorpora-
tion become higher, that act comes closer to a cession of sovereignty, and for de-
mocratic polities, such cessions entail a democratic loss.  Accordingly, dynamic 
incorporation of foreign law has proven controversial both within federal sys-
tems and at the international level.  The problem is most acute when nation 
states agree to delegate lawmaking power to a supranational entity.  In order to 
gain the reciprocal benefits of cooperation and coordination, the delegation 
must be functionally irrevocable or nearly so.  Representation of the member na-
tion states within the decision-making structures of the supranational entity 
can ameliorate, but cannot fully compensate for, the resulting democratic losses 
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suffered by those nation states.  More broadly, the benefits of dynamic incorpo-
ration must always be balanced against its costs, including the cost to self-
governance. 
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INTRODUCTION
When lawmaking bodies incorporate by reference laws from other 
jurisdictions, typically they do not thereby delegate any lawmaking 
power.  Incorporation by reference functions as a shorthand.  It 
adopts the law as it stands at the moment of incorporation.  Future 
changes in the law of the adopted jurisdiction do not take effect in the 
adopting jurisdiction, unless and until the lawmaking body in the 
adopting jurisdiction takes the further step of incorporating the 
changes.  Thus, incorporation by reference is usually static.  However, 
lawmaking bodies sometimes employ a strategy of dynamic incorpora-
tion of foreign1 law, so that if and when the law of the incorporated 
1 Throughout this Article, I use the term “foreign” to refer to truly foreign sover-
eigns, transnational bodies, and different sovereigns within the American federal sys-
tem.  In doing so, I do not mean to deny that for many purposes “[i]nternational law is 
part of our law.”  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  But I am interested 
in how and when international law becomes part of domestic law, and so it would be 
question-begging to begin with this point.  Likewise, I do not deny that the relation of 
U.S. states to one another and to the national government differs in key respects from 
the relation of a U.S. state or the national government to a truly foreign sovereign.  See
2008] Dynamic Incorporation 105
jurisdiction changes, the law of the incorporating jurisdiction changes 
with it.  In contrast to static incorporation, dynamic incorporation 
does delegate lawmaking authority,2 and has therefore proven contro-
versial. 
At the national level, scholars disagree about whether the Consti-
tution permits the United States to enter international agreements 
(whether by treaty or by other means) that cede to foreign, partly for-
eign, or transnational bodies the power to make rules of law that are 
self-executing within the United States and thus binding on U.S. gov-
ernment officials.  For example, David Golove and Henry Monaghan 
each argue that since the founding, the federal government has had 
the power to enter agreements authorizing international and foreign 
bodies to take legislative, executive, and adjudicatory actions that not 
only bind the United States as a matter of international obligation, but 
also operate internally.3  In addition, Edward Swaine has offered a 
functional justification of most delegations of lawmaking authority to 
transnational bodies.4  By contrast, Curtis Bradley, John Yoo, and oth-
ers offer a different picture of the historical record and contend that, 
in any event, modern understandings of the Constitution limit the 
ability of the federal government to place the making, execution, and 
interpretation of law in the hands of foreign bodies that it does not 
control.5
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-90 (1947) (explaining that, in light of the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI, a state cannot treat federal law as “foreign” in the way that it treats 
the law of a truly foreign sovereign).  But cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 
(1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (likening Michigan to Finland, with respect to the fed-
eral government). 
2 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1480 (2000) (“Incorporation by reference of pre-existing text 
cannot violate the nondelegation doctrine, because it does not give away any power.”). 
3 David Golove, The New Confederalism:  Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and 
Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2007).  Whether any given in-
ternational obligation in fact operates internally of its own force depends on whether 
the obligation-creating instrument “conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and 
[whether the treaty] is ratified on these terms.”  Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 
1356 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. 
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
4 See Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1492, 1613-14 (2004) (explaining that diffusing authority among multiple 
transnational bodies often serves the same values as federalism). 
5 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and 
Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1596 (2003) (endorsing a non-self-execution 
approach in order to “reduce many of the constitutional concerns associated with in-
ternational delegations without significantly affecting the United States’s ability to par-
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The proper resolution of the federal constitutional question has 
important consequences both for international agreements into which 
the United States has already entered, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),6 and for international agreements 
into which the United States may enter in the future, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol and successor environmental treaties.  If and when the 
validity of such federal commitments reaches the United States Su-
preme Court, the Justices will no doubt be attentive to the constitu-
tional text, structure, and original understanding, as well as historical 
practice, their own precedents, and the expected consequences of 
whatever rule they announce.7
Likewise, similar tensions will need to be resolved in accordance 
with the particular language, history, and interpretive conventions in 
the European Union (EU) and its member states.  The European 
Court of Justice insists that treaty signatories must bring their domes-
tic law—including constitutional provisions—into conformity with EU 
ticipate in international institutions”); Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collec-
tive Security and the Constitution:  Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the 
United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1598-99 (1994) (calling the delegation of Congress’s 
war power to the United Nations Security Council constitutionally “troublesome”); 
Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:  New Problems 
with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 76-77 (2000) (arguing that treaty-based interna-
tional delegations are unconstitutional due to accountability and legitimacy deficien-
cies); John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1673, 1708-20 (2000) (contending that placing U.S. troops under foreign command 
“creates significant tension with American constitutional principles of government ac-
countability and popular sovereignty, as promoted by the Appointments Clause, the 
unitary executive, and the non-delegation doctrine”); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty 
and the Old Constitution:  The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 
CONST. COMMENT. 87, 88-89, 128 (1998) (arguing that the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention is in tension with the Appointments Clause insofar as it “permits individuals 
who are not officers of the national government to exercise authority under federal 
law that affects the rights of American citizens”). 
6 U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). Under Chapter 19 of 
NAFTA, each signatory nation retains the right to apply its domestic antidumping and 
countervailing-duty law, subject to review by “binational panels.”  Id. ch. 19.  It is un-
clear whether the decisions of these binational panels, which are not subject to review 
by an Article III court, see 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (2006), can directly bind federal agen-
cies. See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 313-14 (2007) (noting 
“doubts about the constitutionality” of a binational panel system). 
7 Although there is no official list, the factors identified in the text closely resem-
ble the “modalities” of constitutional interpretation identified by Philip Bobbitt.  See
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (listing history, text, 
structure, consequences, precedent, and national ethos). 
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obligations,8 while member states insist that EU law must yield to con-
trary domestic constitutional requirements where they conflict.9
To be sure, the looming collision in the EU concerns static as well 
as dynamic incorporation:  under the Westphalian approach of some 
national constitutional courts, even an EU norm that was clear at the 
time of accession would have to yield to a contrary national constitu-
8 See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (“[T]he validity of a 
Community measure . . . cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to . . . 
the constitution of that State . . . .”); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593 
(“[The European Economic Community] Treaty . . . could not . . . be overridden by 
domestic legal provisions . . . .”).  The European Community “has formed only one of 
three ‘pillars’ constituting the overarching European Union entity.”  PAUL CRAIG &
GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 2003).  For an 
argument that the well-established supremacy of European Community norms applies 
for all European Union norms (including those of the second and third pillars), see 
Koen Lenaerts & Tim Corthaut, Of Birds and Hedges:  The Role of Primacy in Invoking 
Norms of EU Law, 31 EUR. L. REV. 287, 289-90 (2006). 
9 See, e.g., Wyrok z dnia 11 maja 2005 r. [ Judgment of May 11, 2005], K 18/04 
(Pol.) (asserting the primacy of Polish constitutional law over EU law).  A summary of 
the “principal reasons for the ruling” can be found at the official website of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal, see Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Pol. Constitutional Trib.], Po-
land’s Membership in the European Union (Accession Treaty), May 11, 2005, 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2008), but only the Polish language text is authoritative.  See also Krystyna 
Kowalik-Banczyk, Should We Polish It Up?  The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of 
Supremacy of EU Law, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1355, 1361-65 (2005), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No10/PDF_Vol_06_No_10_1355-1366_ 
Developments_Kowalik%20final.pdf (analyzing the Accession Treaty case). 
 National constitutional courts have relied on three lines of argument to reject the 
supremacy of European law:  the primacy of fundamental rights, the notion that some 
European actions are ultra vires, and the supposed supremacy of national constitu-
tions.  See Mattias Kumm & Victor Ferreres Comella, The Primacy Clause of the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union, 3 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 473, 474-76 (2005) (identifying these lines of argument as three grounds on 
which national constitutional courts have asserted authority to overrule EU law).  The 
fundamental-rights argument is expressed in the German Constitutional Court’s So-
lange (“so long as”) cases, which first rejected supremacy of European law on the 
ground that it did not include fundamental rights protection.  See Bundesverfassungs-
gericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 37 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 271 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange I].  It then 
accepted supremacy conditionally, finding that adequate rights protection had been 
established.  See BVerfG Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange 
II]; see also Wojciech Sadurski, “Solange, Chapter 3”:  Constitutional Courts in Central 
Europe—Democracy—European Union 2-26 (Dep’t of Law, Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 2006/40, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963757 (describing the use 
of Solange-type arguments by constitutional courts in postcommunist Central and East-
ern European EU member states). 
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tional norm.10  But the issue is more acute with respect to dynamic in-
corporation.  For preexisting EU norms, the act of ratification pro-
vides legitimacy for any subsequent sublimation of a national norm to 
a European one.  By contrast, where the relevant EU norm is promul-
gated (by the European Commission, say) after some nation’s acces-
sion, all that vindicates the EU norm is the original, perhaps decades- 
old, act of accession.  Given the well-mooted “democratic deficit” in 
the EU,11 dynamic incorporation of EU law thus means replacing do-
mestic norms with supranational ones of questionable legitimacy. 
The legitimacy of dynamic incorporation of foreign law also poses 
potential difficulties within federal systems such as the United States, 
both at the state and national levels.  Although some state constitu-
tions expressly prohibit static as well as dynamic incorporation by ref-
erence,12 courts have been reluctant to approve dynamic incorpora-
tion even in states that do not generally prohibit incorporation by 
reference.  Depending on how one counts, either twelve or fifteen 
state high courts forbid dynamic incorporation of federal law as an 
impermissible delegation of lawmaking power,13 and more might for-
bid it if they were to face the question directly. 
10 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 9, at 474-76 (describing jurisprudence on the 
supremacy of national constitutional law over EU law). 
11 The term “democratic deficit” can be attributed to David Marquand.  See DAVID 
MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64-66 (1979) (explaining the democratic deficit 
resulting from the lack of governmental accountability).  For an overview of the de-
mocratic-deficit debate, see CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 8, at 167-75. 
12 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(B) (“No system or code of laws shall be 
adopted by general reference to it.”); N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 13, cl. 4 (“No bill may 
be . . . incorporated in any other bill by reference to its title only . . . .”); OKLA. CONST.
art. V, § 57 (“[N]o law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended 
or conferred, by reference to its title only . . . .”). 
13 Twelve states clearly forbid dynamic incorporation:  Arizona, see State v. Wil-
liams, 583 P.2d 251, 254-55 (Ariz. 1978) (“[I]t is universally held that an incorporation 
by state statute of rules, regulations, and statutes of federal bodies to be promulgated 
subsequent to the enactment of the state statute constitutes an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power.”); California, see People v. Kruger, 121 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583-84 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1975) (citing Brock v. Superior Court, 71 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Cal. 
1937)); Florida, see Fla. Indus. Comm’n v. State ex. rel. Orange State Oil Co., 21 So. 2d 
599, 603 (Fla. 1945); Hawaii, see State v. Tengan, 691 P.2d 365, 373 (Haw. 1984); 
Maine, see State v. Webber, 133 A. 738, 740 (Me. 1926); Michigan, see Lievense v. Mich. 
Unemployment Comp. Comm’n, 55 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Mich. 1952); Ohio, see State v. 
Gill, 584 N.E.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Ohio 1992); Oregon, see Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 
340, 345 (Or. 1959); South Carolina, see Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 202, 205-06 
(S.C. 1922); South Dakota, see State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D. 1970) (per 
curiam); Washington, see State v. Dougall, 570 P.2d 135, 137-39 (Wash. 1977) (en 
banc); and West Virginia, see State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912, 920 (W. Va. 1974). 
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Yet notwithstanding the skeptical states, domestic examples of dy-
namic incorporation of foreign law abound.  For example, some states 
define various terms in their income tax codes in a way that incorpo-
rates definitions found in the federal Internal Revenue Code, includ-
ing definitions that Congress changes after the state decides to incor-
 Arkansas, Kentucky, and Minnesota also forbid dynamic incorporation generally, 
though apparently with exceptions.  For Arkansas, compare Cheney v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. 
Co., 394 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ark. 1965) (“[A]ppellee’s tax liability to Arkansas is based 
upon a formula subject to prospective federal legislation or administrative rules. It is 
[therefore] unconstitutional.”), with Curry v. State, 649 S.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Ark. 1983) 
(allowing dynamic incorporation of federal drug regulations where a state agency re-
tains power to veto the incorporation); for Kentucky, compare Dawson v. Hamilton, 
314 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Ky. 1958) (“[A]doption . . . of prospective Federal legislation . . . 
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), with Hamilton v. City of Louisville, 332 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Ky. 1960) 
(noting that the dynamic incorporation of federal income tax provisions would proba-
bly not be unconstitutional); and for Minnesota, compare Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxa-
tion, 184 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Minn. 1971) (interpreting the incorporation of federal tax 
law statically because the Minnesota legislature “could not . . . grant to Congress the 
right to make future . . . changes in Minnesota law”), with State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 
693, 697 (Minn. 1977) (upholding a state law that dynamically incorporated the fed-
eral determination of what constitutes a controlled substance). 
 Twelve state constitutions explicitly permit dynamic incorporation of federal tax 
law. See infra note 14.  The following seven state high courts have permitted, either ex-
pressly or impliedly but clearly, dynamic incorporation of federal law without relying 
on an explicit constitutional provision:  Alaska, see Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236, 
239 & n.7 (Alaska 1966) (following Alaska S.S. Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 816 (9th 
Cir. 1950) in upholding the dynamic incorporation of federal tax law); Idaho, see State 
v. Kellogg, 568 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Idaho 1977) (upholding a law criminalizing the un-
authorized sale of drugs that require a prescription under state or federal law); Mary-
land, see Katzenberg v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 282 A.2d 465, 470, 473 (Md. 1971) 
(upholding the dynamic incorporation of federal tax law); Massachusetts, see Parker 
Affiliated Cos. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 415 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Mass. 1981); Nebraska, see
Anderson v. Tiemann, 155 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Neb. 1967); Pennsylvania, see Common-
wealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 27 A.2d 62, 63-64 (Pa. 1942) (upholding the dy-
namic incorporation of the federal definition of net income); and Tennessee, see
McFaddin v. Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176, 180-182 (Tenn. 1987) (upholding the dynamic 
incorporation of federal tax law).  In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
commented favorably on dynamic incorporation of federal food-packaging regula-
tions.  See State v. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc., 112 A.2d 726, 732-33 (N.J. 1955) (discussing 
dynamic incorporation at length before finding it was not at issue in the case). 
 Four other states have upheld dynamic incorporation where a state agency retains 
power to veto the incorporation:  Alabama, see McCurley v. State (Ex parte McCurley), 
390 So. 2d 25, 27-29 (Ala. 1980) (upholding a law requiring the state board of health 
to control a substance once it becomes controlled under federal law, absent objection 
by the state agency); Arkansas, see Curry,  649 S.W.2d at 836-37; Minnesota, see King, 257 
N.W.2d at 697; Missouri, see State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Mo. 1982) (en 
banc). 
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porate federal law.14  In addition, liability in tort in some states may 
depend on compliance with federal law, even where the relevant fed-
eral standards go into effect after the state rule (whether legislatively 
or judicially created) incorporating them.15  Further, some states in-
terpret their state constitutions in “lockstep” with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of parallel provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tion, with the consequence that a change in U.S. Supreme Court con-
stitutional jurisprudence can change the meaning of the state consti-
tution.16
14 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1105 (2007) (“The entire taxable income of a 
resident of this State shall be the federal adjusted gross income as defined in the laws 
of the United States as the same are or shall become effective for any taxable year with 
the modifications . . . provided in this subchapter.”).  Twelve state constitutions ex-
pressly allow dynamic incorporation of federal tax law:  Colorado, see COLO. CONST.
art. X, § 19; Hawaii, see HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 2; Illinois, see ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3; 
Kansas, see KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 11; Missouri, see MO. CONST. art. X, § 4(d); New Mex-
ico, see N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 18; New York, see N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 22; North Dakota, 
see N.D. CONST. art. X, § 3; Oklahoma, see OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 12; Oregon, see OR.
CONST. art. IV, § 2; Utah, see UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 4; and Virginia, see VA. CONST.
art. IV, § 11.  In addition, courts in four states have upheld dynamic incorporation of 
federal tax law even in the absence of explicit constitutional authorization:  Alaska, see
Hickel, 416 P.2d at 238-39; Maryland, see Leatherwood v. State, 435 A.2d 477, 479-80 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Massachusetts, see Parker Affiliated Cos., 415 N.E.2d at 831; 
and Tennessee, see McFaddin, 738 S.W.2d at 181-82. 
15 Although states differ over whether violation of a federal statute constitutes neg-
ligence by itself, raises a presumption of negligence, or counts as evidence thereof, nei-
ther the federal nature of a duty nor the fact that the federal statutory or regulatory 
duty arose after the state’s general tort rules disqualifies the duty for incorporation 
under state law as negligence per se.  See Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State 
Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 831, 877-83 (1992) (explaining and cata-
loguing the various approaches taken by states toward negligence per se cases). 
16 See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 818 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (applying 
the dynamic lockstep approach); Mefford v. White, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1260 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2002) (“Illinois courts typically apply the ‘lockstep’ doctrine, which dictates that 
provisions of the Illinois Constitution should be construed in the same manner as simi-
lar provisions of the United States Constitution.”); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial 
Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 656, 692-93 (2000) (citing evidence of, and reasons for, the lockstep approach).  
Interestingly, although the Florida Constitution requires that its search-and-seizure 
provision “be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,” FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 12, the Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that legislative dynamic incorpo-
ration of federal statutory law amounts to an unconstitutional delegation.  See, e.g.,
Adoue v. State, 408 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1981) (“Any attempt to incorporate a law as 
part of this state’s body of laws prior to its creation by the appropriate federal authority 
is an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power.”); Hutchins v. Mayo, 197 So. 
495, 498 (Fla. 1940) (“We cannot accept the view that the state commission may make 
binding rules to be promulgated by the federal bureau in the future.”). 
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Likewise, federal law sometimes dynamically incorporates state 
law.  For example, under the Conformity Act, federal courts applied 
the procedural law of the states in which they sat respectively.17  Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501 (which was enacted by an ordinary Act of 
Congress) makes state privilege law applicable in federal court where 
state law provides the rule of decision.18  In addition, the Assimilative 
Crimes Act incorporates the criminal law of the state in which federal 
land is located.19  The federal judiciary provides yet another example:  
in exercising its power to fashion federal common law in discrete ar-
eas of federal concern, the courts presumptively define the content of 
federal law as state law.20
The foregoing examples reveal that the federal government and 
many states have found dynamic incorporation useful, even as other 
states forbid the practice.  But even without a blanket proscription on 
dynamic incorporation, some instances of the phenomenon will ap-
pear problematic or at least highly peculiar.  For example, to my 
knowledge, no state has ever defined its law to dynamically incorpo-
rate the law of one of its sister states.  Statutory efforts at harmoniza-
tion, such as state-by-state adoption of restatements or uniform codes, 
have typically functioned merely as a form of static incorporation, and 
to the extent that state courts thereafter look to one another for guid-
ance, they treat out-of-state decisions only as persuasive precedent.21
Moreover, to my knowledge, each example of federal dynamic incor-
poration of state law is a territorially limited accommodation to the 
complexities created by a system of federalism.  Congress has not at-
tempted to make the law of a single state applicable, on a dynamic ba-
sis, to the nation as a whole; presumably an attempt to do so—for ex-
ample, via a law specifying that federal law in admiralty cases shall be 
17 See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197, superseded by Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2006); see also 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.02 (3d ed. 2008) (“In 1872, Congress passed the so-
called ‘Conformity Act,’ which required that federal district courts conform their pro-
cedure ‘as near as may be’ with that of the state in which the district was located.”). 
18 FED. R. EVID. 501 (“[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.”). 
19 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).  The Act was upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 
286, 294 (1958), in which the Court claimed that “Congress is within its constitutional 
powers and legislative discretion when, after 123 years of experience with the policy of 
conformity, it enacts that policy in its most complete and accurate form.” 
20 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979) (expressing 
a preference for the dynamic incorporation of state law rather than the formulation of 
a federal rule, absent a demonstrated need for national uniformity). 
21 See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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Florida law or that federal law governing contracts with the federal 
government shall be New York law—would prompt serious misgivings 
if not objections on nondelegation or other constitutional grounds. 
Whether the misgivings indeed rise to the level of state or federal 
constitutional violations is not my main concern here.  My goals are 
analytic and general.  This Article asks how and when dynamic incor-
poration of foreign law does or does not violate democratic principles.  
Given the diversity of state and national constitutions, different states 
and nations will reach different conclusions about whether and to 
what extent dynamic incorporation of foreign law is permissible or de-
sirable.  Nor would it be surprising if some courts that were troubled 
by some instances of dynamic incorporation nonetheless permitted 
the practice on the grounds that the legislature was better situated to 
make these judgments.22  To avoid paying undue attention to any par-
ticular constitutional text or set of doctrines, this Article treats dy-
namic incorporation of foreign law as a general question of institu-
tional design.23  My analysis undoubtedly has implications for 
constitutional interpretation, at least if one thinks that democratic 
theory properly informs constitutional interpretation.  But those im-
plications are at most a bonus; my core concern is the institutional-
design question as such. 
This Article distinguishes between instances of dynamic incorpo-
ration that raise questions of sovereignty and those that, at most, raise 
questions of delegation.  The difference, which proves to be one of de-
gree rather than kind, turns on revocability.  When the several states 
ratified the United States Constitution in 1789 and thereafter, they 
made federal law—whatever its future content—irrevocably operative 
in their respective territories.24  They thereby ceded some of their sov-
ereignty.  By contrast, should the United States by treaty authorize a 
multinational body—the United Nations General Assembly, say—to 
promulgate rules of law that are directly enforceable in U.S. courts as 
22 Such an argument was made, for example, by the Kansas Supreme Court in up-
holding dynamic incorporation.  See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. McDonald, 486 P.2d 1347, 
1352 (Kan. 1971) (“[The legislature] might have designated some other method but 
the need and wisdom of its action is strictly a matter for legislative concern.”). 
23 Reflecting the limits of my own expertise, I disproportionately draw examples 
from the American context. 
24 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (“The Constitution, in all 
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”); 
DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 77-81 (2003) (explaining Lincoln’s under-
standing of a perpetual, unbreakable Union). 
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“the supreme Law of the Land,”25 no serious issue of sovereignty 
would be raised.  The United States would retain the power to abro-
gate the treaty either by its terms or, even failing that, by ordinary leg-
islation pursuant to the rule that a later-in-time statute prevails over an 
earlier-in-time treaty.26  Any objections would sound in principles of 
nondelegation rather than sovereignty. 
The distinction, however, between questions of sovereignty and 
questions of delegation is not binary.  These categories lie on a spec-
trum that includes intermediate cases, such as a partly entrenched 
delegation.  Indeed, even a completely unentrenched delegation is, 
from a practical perspective, partly entrenched.  For example, once a 
treaty comes into effect, the burden of overcoming legislative inertia 
to supersede it can be substantial because repealing a measure is al-
ways more difficult than not enacting it in the first place.27  Further-
more, as a practical matter, an act originally intended only as a delega-
tion may become a cession of sovereignty over time, as arguably 
occurred in the United States between the ratification of the Constitu-
tion and the conclusion of the Civil War.28
To the extent that this Article advances a single thesis, it is this:  
All acts of dynamic incorporation of foreign law pose a prima facie 
threat to democratic principles, but as we move along the spectrum 
from easily revocable delegations to irrevocable cessions of sover-
eignty, the burden of justification for dynamic incorporation in-
creases.  Further, representation of the power-delegating polity or its 
members in the decision-making procedures of the body to which dy-
namic incorporation delegates power, can to some extent substitute 
25 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
26 See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193-95 (1888) (holding that when a 
treaty and statute conflict, “the one last in date will control the other”).  To be sure, a 
later-in-time U.S. law that conflicts with a UN Resolution might violate international 
law, but that would not render the U.S. law inoperative internally. 
27 For an excellent discussion of the degree to which “ordinary” legislation can 
have entrenching effects, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative En-
trenchment:  A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1686-88 (2002). 
28 Justice Holmes put the point this way:  
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Con-
stitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a 
being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by 
the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize or to hope 
that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their 
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.  
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
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for a fully satisfactory functional justification for delegation.  Thus, 
administrative convenience may be sufficient to justify a state’s dy-
namic incorporation of federal income tax law, where that incorpora-
tion can be undone by a simple legislative act.  On the other hand, 
something substantially stronger than administrative convenience 
would be required for a polity to cede sovereignty. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I lays out the core of the 
argument, explaining how dynamic incorporation threatens to un-
dermine democratic principles and how, ceteris paribus, the threat 
increases as the incorporating decision becomes progressively more 
irrevocable. 
Part II distinguishes among three sorts of dynamic incorporation:  
upward incorporation, in which a political entity delegates lawmaking 
authority to a larger political entity, as when a state dynamically incor-
porates federal law; downward incorporation, in which a political entity 
delegates lawmaking authority to a subunit, as when the federal gov-
ernment dynamically incorporates state law; and horizontal incorpora-
tion, in which a political unit dynamically incorporates the law of a 
comparable political unit, as when (to pick a hypothetical but plausi-
ble example), some state dynamically incorporates Delaware corpo-
rate law.29
Part III catalogues and evaluates the principal sorts of reasons that 
a polity might choose to dynamically incorporate the law of another 
jurisdiction. 
Part IV addresses the special case of irrevocable or nearly irrevo-
cable upward incorporation.  Upward incorporation will often prove 
most attractive in circumstances in which states need assurances of re-
ciprocity, but to make those assurances as meaningful as possible, 
states will place limits on revocability.  Thus, some of the most impor-
tant instances of dynamic incorporation—states or nation states agree-
ing to be bound by decisions of interstate or supranational bodies—
prove the most problematic in terms of democratic principles, at least 
29 I mostly bracket a fourth kind of delegation—to private actors—which raises 
sufficiently distinct issues to warrant its own full treatment.  Among these issues is the 
question of how to distinguish, in a world without natural baselines, between delega-
tions of government power to private actors and mere government failure to regulate 
private power.  For a useful discussion of the implications of privatization for the state- 
action doctrine within the United States, see Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delega-
tion, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).  For an argument that beneficiaries of privatized 
government programs have greater ability to enforce accountability than beneficiaries 
of public programs, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 646-66 (2000). 
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prima facie.  Part IV concludes that political representation of the 
states or nation states in the interstate or supranational bodies may be 
the best way to ameliorate the democracy-threatening character of 
upward dynamic incorporation.  It then asks whether such political 
representation is a viable option when the foreign body whose law-
making decisions are dynamically incorporated is a court. 
The Article concludes by observing the kernel of truth in the ar-
gument of jurists and scholars who object to citation of foreign law by 
U.S. courts interpreting U.S. law. 
I. HOW DYNAMIC INCORPORATION THREATENS DEMOCRACY
This Part explains why and how, in a reasonably well-constituted 
democracy, dynamic incorporation of foreign law can threaten de-
mocratic government.  It then explains that the threat is roughly pro-
portional to the obstacles to undoing the decision to dynamically in-
corporate foreign law.  A truly irrevocable decision amounts to a 
cession of sovereignty over the relevant subject matter, but even 
nominally unentrenched decisions to dynamically incorporate foreign 
law can be “sticky” in practice, and thus dynamic incorporation always 
poses some prima facie threat to democratic values. 
A.  The Prima Facie Threat to Democracy 
Dynamic incorporation of foreign law poses a prima facie threat 
to the democracy of the incorporating polity because it takes decisions 
out of the hands of the people’s representatives in that polity and 
delegates them to persons and bodies that are accountable only to a 
different polity, if at all.  Under various circumstances, such a delega-
tion of power may be sensible as a matter of policy.  It may even in-
crease the democratic accountability of the political system as a whole.  
Nonetheless, where the polity that dynamically incorporates foreign 
law is a reasonably well-constituted democracy, the act authorizing dy-
namic incorporation undermines self-government within that polity so 
conceived. 
In making this claim, I do not have in mind any special definitions 
of terms like “democracy” or “reasonably well-constituted.”  I mean 
simply to distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic regimes 
by whatever standards might be used to draw the distinction in clear 
cases.  For example, as of this writing, Canada and its provinces, the 
United States and its individual states, and the member states of the 
European Union all count as reasonably well-constituted democracies, 
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while Cuba, Egypt, and North Korea do not.30  I am not concerned 
with intermediate cases such as Russia.31  I want to limit my discussion 
to reasonably well-constituted democracies because delegation of 
power from the decision-making organs of nondemocracies, by defini-
tion, does not threaten democracy (although it may threaten other 
values, such as national self-determination, at least if one assumes that 
national self-determination does not depend on popular rule). 
My contention that dynamic incorporation poses a prima facie 
threat to democracy may seem inconsistent with the familiar notion 
that within any political system as a whole—including, for these pur-
poses, the international legal system—different kinds of decisions are 
sensibly allocated to different levels of government.  There must have 
been an initial decision to design political institutions so that respon-
sibility for various kinds of policy issues resides at the local, state, na-
tional, or supranational level, after all; unless we are prepared to say 
that all such initial allocations of jurisdiction are perfect, we might 
think that the decision of one polity to dynamically incorporate an-
other’s law is simply a decision to revisit the initial allocation of au-
thority among different levels of government.  Is the resulting post-
dynamic-incorporation allocation necessarily inferior, from the stand-
point of democracy, to the initial one? 
Not necessarily, but from the perspective of the polity making the 
decision, ceteris paribus, it is.  To begin, where neither the incorpo-
rating polity nor its members are represented in the polity whose law 
is dynamically incorporated, there is a clear democratic loss.  To ad-
vert to categories that I develop more fully in Part II, dynamic incor-
poration is not even potentially equivalent to the reallocation of au-
thority among different levels of government when it amounts to 
horizontal incorporation or downward incorporation of a single jurisdic-
tion’s law.  Whatever else might be said for a decision by Newfound-
land to be governed by Quebec law (horizontal incorporation), or for 
Germany as a whole to be governed by the law of Bavaria on some sub-
30 See, e.g., LAZA KEKIC, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE ECONOMIST INTEL-
LIGENCE UNIT’S INDEX OF DEMOCRACY 3-5 tbl.1 (2007), available at
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2008) (ranking countries from most to least “democratic”); Freedom 
House, Freedom in the World 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ 
fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (ranking countries on “politi-
cal rights” and “civil liberties”).
31 See KEKIC, supra note 30, at 4 tbl.1 (scoring Russia in the middle of the scale on 
democracy); Freedom House, supra note 30 (placing Russia in the middle of the scale 
on political rights and civil liberties). 
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ject (downward incorporation of a single jurisdiction’s law), in neither 
case do we have a reallocation of power from one democratic unit to 
another.  So far as citizens of Newfoundland are concerned, the gov-
ernment of Quebec is not democratic because it does not represent 
Newfoundlanders.  Likewise, so far as Germany as a whole is con-
cerned, the government of Bavaria is not democratic because it pro-
vides no representation whatsoever to persons residing in other 
Länder (states).32
By contrast, upward incorporation can, under some circumstances, 
function as the rough equivalent of the reallocation of jurisdiction be-
tween government units, because the citizens of the incorporating ju-
risdiction have representation in the government of the jurisdiction 
whose law is incorporated.  Indeed, as Part IV argues, such representa-
tion can, under some circumstances, substitute for a fully effective 
functional justification for dynamic incorporation. 
Upward incorporation, however, invariably exacts a democratic 
cost (albeit one that may sometimes be outweighed by countervailing 
benefits).  One need not believe that people always have the mobility 
to find the polity with policies best suited to their preferences33 to rec-
ognize that, absent a geographically homogeneous distribution of pol-
icy preferences, people generally have a greater likelihood of approv-
ing the policy choices of their local governments than of their 
supralocal governments.  And whatever the distribution of prefer-
ences, as a matter of simple arithmetic, an individual’s vote is worth 
proportionally more in a smaller polity than in a larger one (assuming 
apportionment on principles that do not deviate wildly from one per-
son, one vote).34
32 Nonetheless, as I acknowledge in Part II, horizontal incorporation and territori-
ally limited downward incorporation can enhance democracy in the aggregate. 
33 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418 (1956) (presenting the classic model in which “[t]he consumer-voter may be 
viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public 
goods[,]” and claiming that “[t]he greater the number of communities and the greater 
the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his pref-
erence position”).  Regional migration patterns within the United States tend to show 
that people do try to match their policy preferences to those of other citizens in choos-
ing where to live.  See Robert R. Preuhs, State Policy Components of Interstate Migration in 
the United States, 52 POL. RES. Q. 527, 527-49 (1999) (finding that the “consumer-voter 
model explains a significant portion of the variation in aggregate migration behav-
ior”). 
34 Representation in the United States Senate does substantially deviate from one-
person–one-vote principles.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-
TION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN COR-
118 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 103
These considerations do not mean that it never makes sense for a 
polity to delegate authority upward or that doing so is necessarily un-
democratic.  They do show, however, that the resulting allocation of 
authority will be somewhat less democratic than maintaining relatively 
local control over the relevant policy question.  Various reasons might 
justify upward delegations of authority, including overcoming collec-
tive action problems, taking advantage of economies of scale, and co-
ordinating regulation.  Part III looks at these and other grounds for 
dynamic incorporation in greater detail.  My point here is simply that 
the decision of a polity to be governed on some set of questions by the 
decisions of others—including others of whom they are a proper sub-
set—is almost always a decision for that polity to forego some measure 
of self-government. 
B.  The Revocability Spectrum 
Polity A’s decision to delegate decision-making power over some 
class of questions to Polity B via dynamic incorporation (or via other 
methods of delegation) does not divest A of sovereignty over this class 
of questions, unless the delegation is irrevocable.  Revocability, how-
ever, is not merely an on/off condition.  It can be a matter of degree.  
Ceteris paribus, the greater the formal and practical obstacles to revo-
RECT IT) 49-62 (2006) (critiquing the Constitution’s assignment of two senators to 
each state, regardless of size, as fundamentally undemocratic).  Accordingly, a decision 
by a very small state like Vermont or Wyoming to dynamically incorporate federal law 
does not dilute the political influence that individual Vermonters or Wyomingites ex-
ercise over the laws that govern them nearly as much as a similar decision by a large 
state like California or Texas dilutes the political influence of Californians or Texans.  
Nonetheless, even voters in the smallest states lose a measure of democratic represen-
tation when they cede authority to the federal government.  According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, in 2006 the national population was just under 300 million.  U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
00000.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).  Thus, if the 100 Senate seats were apportioned 
on a strictly proportional basis, it would take six million people to elect two senators.  
In fact, however, the smallest state, Wyoming, with an estimated population of just over 
half a million in 2006, id. at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56000.html, 
elects two senators.  Thus, Wyoming has roughly twelve times the representation in the 
Senate as it would have if seats were allocated proportionate to population.  However, 
Wyomingites still only elect one-fiftieth of the U.S. Senate, whereas they elect all of the 
Wyoming legislature.  The twelvefold increase in influence relative to the national 
population does not compensate for the fiftyfold decrease in influence that accompa-
nies delegation to a much larger polity.  Hence, even for population-challenged Wyo-
ming, dynamic incorporation of federal law entails a democratic loss—one that is 
compounded when we take account of the much-closer-to proportional influence that 
Wyoming exercises over the choice of House members and the President. 
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cation of a decision to dynamically incorporate the laws of a foreign 
jurisdiction, the greater the threat that such dynamic incorporation 
poses to democracy. 
We can see the importance of revocability to democratic critiques 
of dynamic incorporation by looking at the importance of revocability 
to democracy more generally.  Consider a leading example:  Article 
79(3) of the German Constitution purports to categorically forbid cer-
tain sorts of amendments,35 but scholars have questioned whether this 
sort of permanent entrenchment is legitimate.36  What gave the draft-
ers of the original Article 79(3) the right to decide any matter for all 
time?
This is a hard question that also can be, and has been, asked about 
the less severe forms of entrenchment that one commonly sees in con-
stitutions.  What gives any supermajority at any time the right to en-
trench its work against change by a mere ordinary majority?  A satis-
factory account of constitutional entrenchment—and thus of 
constitutionalism itself—must provide an answer to this question. 
We should distinguish two sorts of problems with entrenchment.  
The first is simply a matter of positive law.  Akhil Amar has argued that 
the arduous amendment procedure set out in Article V of the U.S. 
Constitution is not the exclusive means of amending the Constitution, 
suggesting that a national referendum would also be effective.37  Like-
35 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Federal Consti-
tution] art. 79(3) (F.R.G.), translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 35 (Gisbert H. Flanz et al. eds., Supp. 2007) (“Amendments to this Basic Law 
affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in 
the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inad-
missible.”). 
36 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate:  Entrenchment 
and Retroactivity, 12 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 386-96, 403-05 (1987) (examining objec-
tions to entrenchment in British and American contexts); Michael J. Klarman, Majori-
tarian Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502-09 (1997) (de-
scribing majoritarian objections to legislative and cross-temporal entrenchment); 
Frank I. Michelman, Entrenchment and the Dignity of Legislation 8 (Apr. 19, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the notion of entrench-
ment can only be gauged against a normative idea of representative democracy). 
37 See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:  Amending the Constitution Outside Ar-
ticle V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) (“[T]he first, most undeniable inalienable 
and important, if unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a majority of voters 
to amend the Constitution—even in ways not expressly provided for by Article V.”); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:  Constitutional Amendment Outside Arti-
cle V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 457 (1994) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution is a far more ma-
joritarian and populist document than we have generally thought; and We the People 
of the United States have a legal right to alter our Government—to change our Consti-
tution—via a majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, 
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wise, one might think that Germans could circumvent Article 79(3) 
simply by amending Article 79(3) itself.  According to these sorts of 
arguments, the U.S. and German Constitutions are best read—by 
their own terms and in accordance with their respective histories—not 
to be as deeply entrenched as they appear to be.  These arguments 
draw some support from claims about the democratic (il)legitimacy of 
entrenchment, but they do so in order to better explain the scope of 
entrenchment that actually exists under current law. 
A second kind of problem with entrenchment concerns legitimacy 
directly.  Critics attentive to this problem typically begin with the (rea-
sonable) assumption that contemporary majorities have the best claim 
to legitimate lawmaking authority.38  According to this argument, one 
generation never has the power to bind another, or if one generation 
does have some power to bind later generations, the power must be 
limited in some way.39  This sort of argument is sometimes used to at-
tack the practice of judicial review,40 but it also applies to constitution-
alism itself. 
I am not now interested in whether persuasive answers can be 
given to critics of constitutional entrenchment.  Instead, I merely wish 
to note a common and apparently justified assumption in this debate:  
as the degree of entrenchment of a constitutional provision (or its au-
thoritative interpretation by a constitutional court) increases, so too 
does the difficulty of reconciling the provision (or its interpretation) 
with democratic principles.  For example, a constitutional rule that 
prohibits criminalization of abortion is more “countermajoritarian” in 
a constitutional system like that of the United States, in which it can 
even though that mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article V.”).  But see Henry 
Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121-22 (1996) (arguing that Amar “ignores the crucial role re-
served for the states in the newly established constitutional order,” and that “the Con-
stitution nowhere contemplates any form of direct, unmediated lawmaking or constitu-
tion-making by ‘the People’”). 
38 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1998) (“The first question any advocate of constitutionalism 
must answer is why Americans of today should be bound by the decisions of people 
some 212 years ago.”). 
39 See ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 216 (updated ed. 
2005) (“Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the 
ages and generations which preceded it.” (quoting THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man)).
40 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 36, at 494-95 (critiquing judicial review on the 
ground that standard sources of decision-making, including “[t]ext, original intent, 
and tradition[,] are problematic . . . because of the dead hand problem”). 
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only be reversed by a difficult process of constitutional amendment41
(or through the judicial appointments process42), than it is in a consti-
tutional system like that of Canada,43 where it can be superseded by 
the national Parliament acting pursuant to the “notwithstanding 
clause” of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.44
To contend that the burden of persuasion on those who would 
justify entrenchment increases as the degree of entrenchment in-
creases is not to say whether or when that burden can be met.  It is not 
even to say that this is the only way of framing the problem.  One 
could, alternatively, assert that as the state seeks to regulate increas-
ingly personal matters, its burden of justification also increases.  One 
could even argue that protection of certain fundamental freedoms is 
so essential to constitutional democracy that the failure to protect 
them—that is, the exposure of individuals to state regulation in the 
area of these freedoms—would render the state less “democratic,” 
even as it became more “majoritarian.”45  But this is a somewhat ten-
dentious (which is not to say incorrect) use of the word “democratic.”  
When I say that Roe v. Wade46 or, for that matter, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,47 is prima facie undemocratic, 
all I mean is that the decision and the clause place limits on the laws 
that duly elected legislative majorities can enact.  Anyone who thinks 
41 See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that either a two-thirds majority of both houses 
of Congress or two-thirds of state legislatures must propose a constitutional amend-
ment, and that either the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states must 
ratify an amendment before it is adopted). 
42 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (suggesting that “[p]artisan entrenchment 
through presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best account of how the 
meaning of the Constitution changes over time through Article III interpretation 
rather than through Article V amendment”). 
43 The Canadian Supreme Court found criminal prohibition of abortion unconsti-
tutional in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
44 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, 
§ 33(1) (U.K.) (“Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in 
an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provi-
sion thereof shall operate notwithstanding [its violation of certain rights.]”). 
45 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 17-18 (1996) (making this argument in support of a “constitutional,” as 
opposed to a “majoritarian,” conception of democracy); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 19-36 (2006) (rejecting 
methods of constitutional interpretation that seek only to perfect the processes of rep-
resentative democracy). 
46 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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that I should use the word “majoritarian” rather than “democratic” 
should feel free to substitute the former for the latter; such a dis-
agreement on this point is semantic, not substantive. 
This digression into constitutional law illustrates a commonplace 
that verges on the tautological:  from the standpoint of democratic 
(or, if you prefer, majoritarian) values, entrenchment of constitu-
tional provisions (or interpretations thereof) against simple majori-
tarian change stands in need of justification, and the greater the en-
trenchment, the greater the burden of justification. 
We can readily generalize the point about entrenchment to other 
limits on decision making placed upon officials elected within the 
relevant polity:  from the standpoint of democratic values, the greater 
the entrenchment of the delegation to a body not directly account-
able to the polity in question, the greater the burden of justification.  
Other things being equal, it takes a stronger argument to justify Polity 
A’s decision to dynamically incorporate Polity B’s law if the incorpo-
rating decision can only be undone by a supermajority vote of the leg-
islature than it takes to justify an incorporating decision that can be 
undone by a simple majority vote. 
The fact that formal entrenchment makes dynamic incorporation 
(and other sorts of delegation) more problematic should not obscure 
the fact that even formally unentrenched incorporation raises prima 
facie democratic problems because, as a practical matter, all legisla-
tion is entrenched in some sense.48  Ordinary laws that can be re-
pealed by simple-majority vote are actually formally entrenched (even 
if only slightly), because obtaining a majority to repeal a law means 
obtaining more votes than are required to prevent the enactment of 
new legislation.  Moreover, in legal systems like the United States and 
all but one of its states, the requirement of bicameral passage and sig-
nature by the President or governor for “ordinary” legislation is, on its 
face, a supermajority process.49  And, of course, as a practical matter, 
the burden of overcoming legislative inertia even in a single house of 
48 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1686-88 (“If there are political or logis-
tical costs to repealing legislation—and there surely are—then an earlier Congress 
‘binds’ a later Congress by enacting legislation that cannot be costlessly repealed or 
changed, except in those instances when it provides for the legislation to expire on its 
own.”). 
49 See LEVINSON, supra note 34, at 29-49 (explaining how the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of the Constitution’s Article I, Section 7, protect the status 
quo against new legislation). 
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the legislature makes the repeal of legislation substantially more diffi-
cult than its nonenactment in the first place. 
The closest thing to a completely unentrenched law is a law with a 
sunset provision, but even these laws are entrenched during the pe-
riod from their enactment until their sunset.  Further, in some cir-
cumstances laws that formally sunset create expectations of renewal.  
Most notoriously, appropriations measures that distribute concen-
trated benefits create powerful constituencies that lobby for their con-
tinual reenactment, as the U.S. experience with agricultural subsidies 
demonstrates.50  Despite the fact that such subsidies must be reen-
acted with each budget bill,51 critics of subsidies accurately complain 
about the difficulty of “eliminating,” rather than “not reenacting,” 
these technically sunsetting measures.52
To be sure, dynamic incorporation by A of B’s law will not invaria-
bly create the sort of constituency for reenactment that agricultural 
subsidies do, but in some circumstances the practical obstacles to 
eliminating dynamic incorporation (regardless of whether the act of 
incorporation formally sunsets) will be formidable.  For instance, 
when multiple polities collectively undertake to incorporate the future 
enactments of a supranational body—as in the EU or NAFTA—and 
when the only way to opt out of one of those enactments is to opt out 
of the entire apparatus, with potentially disastrous economic and dip-
lomatic consequences, we may treat the act of dynamic incorporation 
as effectively irrevocable.  Indeed, de facto irrevocability is often the 
very point of such arrangements, precisely because supranational enti-
ties aim to provide assurances of reciprocal treatment, thus solving 
collective action problems that could otherwise lead to suboptimal 
outcomes such as trade wars.53
*      *      * 
50 See Dan Morgan et al., Powerful Interests Ally to Restructure Agriculture Subsidies,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2006, at A1 (“Ever since subsidies began . . . Farm Belt politi-
cians . . . have repeatedly thwarted efforts to scale [them] back . . . .”). 
51 See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal 
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 397-401 (1998) (explaining the budget proc-
ess for the renewal of discretionary spending). 
52 See, e.g., Morgan et al., supra note 50. 
53 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Gov-
ernance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 429 (2000) (describing the EU and NAFTA as “‘clubs’ of 
sincerely committed states” purposely accepting the high costs of withdrawal in order 
to “identif[y] . . . as having a low propensity to defect”). 
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In sum, all instances of dynamic incorporation of foreign law raise 
prima facie questions of democratic accountability.  The entrench-
ment of the incorporated law against ordinary democratic processes 
exacerbates the problem, but even when there is no formal en-
trenchment, the problem persists, in part because all law is en-
trenched in some sense. 
II. DIRECTIONS OF INCORPORATION: UP, DOWN, AND ACROSS
This Part introduces a three-part typology of dynamic incorpora-
tion: upward incorporation, in which a political entity delegates law-
making authority to a larger political entity; downward incorporation, 
in which a political entity delegates lawmaking authority to a subunit; 
and horizontal incorporation, in which a political unit dynamically in-
corporates the law of a comparable political unit. 
A.  Up 
When a polity dynamically incorporates the law of a larger entity 
of which it is a component, it incorporates upward.  Within the United 
States, state tax codes provide a familiar example.  Some such codes 
define “gross income” as the federal definition of gross income, even 
if the federal definition changes (as it frequently does) after the en-
actment of the state incorporating law.54
I shall also use the term upward incorporation to refer to deci-
sions to dynamically incorporate some legal norms of supranational 
bodies.  When the Czech Republic joined the European Union, for 
example, it agreed to make EU legal norms—including prospective 
norms that the EU itself had not yet adopted at the time of the Czech 
accession—applicable in the Czech Republic.55  This was upward in-
corporation even though, under the dominant Westphalian paradigm, 
the Czech Republic did not cede any of its sovereignty to the EU (be-
cause accession is revocable).56  To be sure, under the German Solange
54 See supra note 14. 
55 See Saulius Lukas Kaleda, Immediate Effect of Community Law in the New Member 
States:  Is there a Place for a Consistent Doctrine?, 10 EUR. L.J. [U.K.] l02, 102 (2004) (as-
serting that the principle that EU Community law becomes applicable in a member 
state immediately upon accession nonetheless allows for some preexisting disputes to 
be governed by the state’s preexisting law in accordance with “specific legal principles 
[that] constitute part of community inter-temporal law”). 
56 See Mattias Kumm, To be a European Citizen?  The Absence of Constitutional Patriot-
ism and the Constitutional Treaty, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 481, 495 (2005) (arguing that, 
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decisions and comparable rulings, European Constitutional Courts 
purport to retain the authority to invalidate EU norms that violate na-
tional constitutions.57  But these rulings only show that an EU law that 
is dynamically incorporated by an EU member state may sometimes 
prove to be invalid, just as a domestic statute enacted by the parlia-
ment of an EU member state may be held invalid by that member 
state’s constitutional court.  EU accession counts as upward dynamic 
incorporation because in ordinary cases, it gives the force of law to fu-
ture EU laws and regulations that otherwise would have no effect 
within the country in question. 
B.  Down 
When a polity dynamically incorporates the law of one of its sub-
units, it incorporates downward.  Within the United States, examples 
of express decisions by Congress to dynamically incorporate the law of 
states include the Assimilative Crimes Act,58 Federal Rule of Evidence 
501,59 and the Rules of Decision Act60—although in this last example 
there is a colorable argument that Congress has no authority to make 
federal law, and so state law applies of its own force by virtue of the 
Tenth Amendment, rather than as a result of a congressional decision 
to incorporate it dynamically.61  Putting this last caveat aside, in each 
despite debate about the legal process for withdrawing from the EU, “the right to 
withdrawal remain[s] a residual sovereign right, unencumbered by and antecedent to 
EU Law”). 
57 See Carlsen v. Prime Minister, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 854 (Den.) (holding that 
European law that violates basic Danish constitutional rights is unenforceable in Dan-
ish courts); Solange II, supra note 9 (conditionally accepting European law’s supremacy 
because it had developed sufficient fundamental-rights protection); Solange I, supra
note 9 (denying the supremacy of European law on the ground that European law 
lacks fundamental-rights protection); Corte cost. [Constitutional Court], 13 apr. 1989, 
n.232, Foro It. I, 1855 (Italy) (holding that European law must conform to the funda-
mental-rights protections of the Italian Constitution); see also supra note 9. 
58 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006); see also supra text accompanying note 19. 
59 FED. R. EVID. 501; see also supra text accompanying note 18. 
60 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Con-
stitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.”). 
61 This is the argument to which Justice Brandeis alludes in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), suggesting that the Constitution requires the Rules of 
Decision Act to be construed so as to deny federal courts the power to formulate gen-
eral federal common law.  At its core, Justice Brandeis’s argument asserts that where 
Congress has no Article I power to regulate, it may not assign to the courts the power 
to resolve disputes on the basis of judge-made rules.  To be sure, given the expansive 
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of these instances, Congress requires the application of state law, and 
the question of which state’s law applies will be answered differently 
for different cases. 
We can also imagine a form of downward dynamic incorporation 
that selects the law of a single subunit and makes it applicable as the 
law of the whole larger entity.  In particular industries, standard form 
contracts sometimes come to include choice-of-law clauses that select 
the law of a jurisdiction with no clear connection to the underlying 
contract,62 and we can thus imagine that, pursuant to a mimic-the-
market approach, some federal statute might do the same, at least as a 
default rule.  Consider, for example, a federal statute stating that fed-
eral contracts will be governed by the contract law of New York State.  
Because much contract law is judge made,63 here the federal act of 
dynamic incorporation would put into place future decisions of the 
New York courts in addition to the New York legislature, but that 
should not give us serious pause. 
Indeed, true dynamic incorporation will typically incorporate not 
only the future text of the statutes of the incorporated jurisdiction, 
but also the future authoritative interpretations thereof.  To give an 
example in the upward incorporation context, states that require 
“lockstep” interpretation of their state constitutional rights require 
their state high courts to lock their steps with those of the United 
States Supreme Court in its future interpretations of federal constitu-
tional rights.64
modern view of the Commerce Clause—even after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)—there are few subjects over 
which Congress lacks Article I power.  However, as George Rutherglen has argued per-
suasively, there is a further, horizontal, dimension to the constitutional view of Erie:
even where Congress has Article I power over some subject matter, it cannot delegate 
that power to the courts on a wholesale basis but only in cases that happen to fall 
within the courts’ jurisdiction under Article III and Title 28.  See George Rutherglen, 
Reconstructing Erie:  A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 285, 
288, 295-96 (1993); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV.
327, 342-45 (1992) (challenging interpretations of Erie that “assum[e] federal courts 
can exercise common law powers in any area that has been visited by congressional 
legislation”). 
62 See Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law:  The Failure of Re-
vised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 94-99 
(2005) (surveying states that uphold contractual choice of law “irrespective of whether 
the transaction has any relationship to the law chosen”). 
63 See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 2 (rev. 3d 
ed. 2003) (“Despite the statutory provisions that govern certain areas, much of modern 
contract law is still based on common law decisions.”). 
64 See supra note 16. 
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C.  Across 
When a polity dynamically incorporates the law of a polity with 
which it has no hierarchical relationship, it incorporates horizontally.  
Examples of static horizontal incorporation abound.  States attaining 
independence frequently adopt “reception acts,” which keep the law 
of their former colonial masters in effect pending the adoption of new 
law.65  This amounts to horizontal incorporation at the point at which 
the reception act becomes the law of the newly independent state,  
because the new state stands on (newly) equal footing with the former 
master state.  However, reception acts usually operate statically.  Post-
independence changes in the law of the mother country do not, by 
virtue of the reception act, automatically become the law of the 
daughter state. 
Examples of one especially unproblematic form of horizontal dy-
namic incorporation abound.  States frequently authorize the applica-
tion of the law of foreign states to transactions involving citizens or 
subjects of that foreign state interacting with the host state.  For ex-
ample, California could be said to dynamically incorporate the law of 
foreign states insofar as California (like other American states) per-
mits residents of other American states and foreign nations who pos-
sess valid driver’s licenses from their states of residence to drive in 
California.66  As the motor vehicle licensing laws of these other states 
change, California’s treatment of out-of-state visitors changes along 
with them.  Indeed, California even permits unlicensed drivers to 
65 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 6 (“All the laws which have heretofore 
been adopted . . . in . . . Massachusetts Bay . . . shall still remain and be in full force, 
until altered or repealed by the legislature . . . .”); UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK 
INDONESIA 1945 [Constitution] Transitional Provisions, art. 1, translated in 9 CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 35, at 19 (“All existing laws and 
regulations shall remain in effect as long as new laws and regulations have not yet 
taken effect under this Constitution.”).  For an overview of reception acts in U.S. states, 
see generally ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776–
1836, at 46 (1964), which summarizes each state’s reenactment of all or some British 
statutes.  On other former colonies retaining the law of their colonizers, see Ruth L. 
Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property:  Narratives of Developing Country 
Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 334-
35 & nn.73-74 (2003).  See also M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 360-409 (1975) (discussing “independent na-
tion[s that have] of [their] own volition imported into [themselves] a legal system (or 
parts of such a system) which is the product of a totally dissimilar legal culture”). 
66 CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 12502–05 (West 2000); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.04(c)-(d) (2005); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 250 (McKinney 2005); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.2-307 (2005). 
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drive for a limited period if their state or country of residence does 
not require licenses.67  Accordingly, whether a visitor to California may 
drive without a license depends on whether her home state requires 
licenses; should the foreign law change, her legal ability to drive in 
California would change as well. 
We can readily find other examples of this sort.  Under familiar 
conflicts principles, courts routinely apply the laws of foreign states, 
either because the forum state’s conflicts law directly makes foreign 
law applicable, or because the forum state’s contract law makes a vol-
untarily adopted choice-of-law provision enforceable.68  And unless the 
parties to a contract otherwise specify, the operative law that will be 
applied by the forum state will be the foreign law at the time that the 
dispute arises, not at the time that the forum state (either legislatively 
or by judicial decision) set forth the relevant choice-of-law or contract 
rule.
State recognition of out-of-state marriages works in roughly the 
same manner.  Subject to a controversial public-policy exception, U.S. 
states recognize marriages that took place in their sister states and 
foreign countries, even when the couple would not have been eligible 
to marry in the host state.69
It is a nice semantic question whether to call laws of the foregoing 
sort actual examples of dynamic horizontal incorporation.  As a for-
mal matter, it is true that state laws governing driving, conflicts, mar-
riage, and some other subjects do make the legality of an act in State 
A turn on the law of State B at some time that is at least potentially 
later than the State A law went into effect.  But these sorts of laws do 
67 See CAL. VEH. CODE § 12503. 
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971) (“A court, sub-
ject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on 
choice of law.”); id. § 187(1) (“The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern 
their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which 
the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to 
that issue.”). 
69 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (2008) (“All marriages contracted outside 
this state that would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the marriages 
were consummated and in which the parties then actually resided shall be valid in all 
the courts in this state.  This section shall not apply to a marriage between persons of 
the same sex.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-209 (2006) (“All marriages contracted without 
this state, which would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the same 
were contracted, are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this state.  
Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, 
same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or 
country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state.”). 
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not raise the questions of democratic legitimacy that are the primary 
concern of this Article—or at least do not raise them to the same de-
gree as do other instances of dynamic incorporation. 
When California permits a visiting Oregonian to drive because of 
her compliance with Oregon law, California does (revocably) cede 
some of its regulatory authority to Oregon,70 but it does so as a sup-
plement to, rather than a replacement of, its own regulatory efforts.  
Likewise, the decision to adjudicate a dispute based on the law of a 
foreign jurisdiction typically rests upon either a voluntary commit-
ment by the parties or the conclusion that the foreign jurisdiction has 
a greater regulatory interest in the subject matter; the forum state con-
tinues to apply its own law to persons and transactions more closely 
connected to the state.  Accordingly, we would do better to focus on 
horizontal circumstances in which Polity A makes the law of Polity B its
own law, rather than applying it to special cases as a supplement to the 
law of A.  Such cases are unusual, but they can be found. 
Israel between 1948 and 1955 provides a case study.  When Israel 
attained independence from Great Britain in 1948, it continued to use 
a colonial-era law that incorporated, on a dynamic basis, English com-
mon law decisions on questions as to which Israeli law was silent.71  By 
1955, however, the Supreme Court of Israel realized that this practice 
was anomalous.  Thenceforth, the Court declared, it would treat Eng-
lish common law decisions as persuasive precedent only,72 although 
70 Whether even this limited statement is true depends upon the extent to which 
California is free, under the Federal Constitution, to prevent Oregon-licensed non-
Californians from driving in California.  The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the Fourteenth Amendment all limit 
that freedom.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999) (identifying these consti-
tutional provisions, as well as the constitutional structure itself, as sources of a constitu-
tional right to travel); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (hold-
ing that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state from enforcing laws that 
“place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on . . . interstate motor carriers en-
tering or crossing its territory”). 
71 See Law and Administrations Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 7 (1948) (Isr.) 
(adopting, among other provisions, Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, 
MOSES DOUKHAN, 2 LAWS OF PALESTINE 429, 431 (1933)); see also U. Yadin, Reception 
and Rejection of English Law in Israel, 11 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 59, 60-61 (1962) (noting 
that, under the British Mandate, Israeli courts were to “rel[y] on English law [when-
ever the legal question] was a problem which fell into a gap, a lacuna, of the local 
law”). 
72 See Michael Zander, Book Review, 13 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1133, 1133 (1964) (re-
viewing E. DAVID GOITEN, Selected Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel, 1948-1958
(1962)) (describing the decision in CA 92/55 Kohavi v. Becker [1955] P.D. 11 225). 
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the Knesset did not formally repeal the act incorporating English 
common law until 1980.73
The view that dynamic horizontal incorporation is of dubious le-
gitimacy appears to be widespread, and thus I have been able to find 
relatively few examples in which one polity applies the law of another 
unrelated polity as its own law.  Nonetheless, there is a closely related 
phenomenon that raises the same basic concerns.  Consider East 
Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, the Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, Palau, and Panama.  Each of these small, developing 
countries has decided not to devote any of its limited resources to 
managing its own monetary policy.  Accordingly, none of these coun-
tries has its own currency, but instead has designated the United 
States dollar as its official currency.74  Thus, U.S. laws and regulatory 
actions governing the currency directly affect the currency of each of 
these countries.  Whenever the Federal Reserve Board, acting pursu-
ant to authority delegated by Congress,75 tightens or loosens the 
money supply, its actions affect not only the United States currency 
but, by virtue of the dynamic incorporation, also the money supply in 
East Timor, even though East Timor is not in any way part of, or rep-
resented in, the United States. 
In addition, some countries that maintain their own currency 
“peg” that currency to the U.S. dollar, meaning that the government 
commits to an official fixed exchange rate with the dollar.76  Some of 
these pegs act simply as unofficial commitments on the part of foreign 
governments to adopt fiscal and monetary policies that keep their cur-
rency at the preset exchange rate.77  However, where the decision to 
peg is embodied in a law, that law might be said to dynamically incor-
porate U.S. law and regulatory actions governing the dollar, because 
any subsequent changes in U.S. law or monetary policy—and con-
73 Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1979–80) (Isr.). 
74 See MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEW OF 
EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS, AND CONTROLS 32 tbl.7 (Nov. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/112707.pdf (listing coun-
tries that have officially adopted or pegged to the currency of another country).  Pa-
nama officially calls the U.S. dollars that it uses for currency “balboas,” even though 
there are no actual balboa notes.  See id. at 31 n.4. 
75 See 12 U.S.C. § 411 (2006) (authorizing the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve system to issue federal reserve notes). 
76 See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY 447-58 (7th ed. 2005) (providing an overview of fixed exchange 
rates).
77 See id. at 456-58. 
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comitant effects of those changes on the dollar’s value against curren-
cies that are not pegged to it—take effect automatically within the 
pegging countries. 
Needless to say, countries seeking a currency without creating one 
of their own, or seeking stability through pegging, have choices be-
sides dollars.  Thus, for example, the official currency of Montenegro 
is the euro, even though Montenegro is not part of the European Un-
ion.78  Likewise, since its introduction, other countries outside of the 
EU have pegged their currency to the euro.79
Whether a polity’s adoption of another sovereign’s currency or a 
law formally pegging the polity’s own currency to a foreign currency 
should be seen as dynamic incorporation of foreign law is not entirely 
clear.  The answer to that question might depend on what other laws 
operate in the polity.  For example, limits contained in laws governing 
the interest rates that Panama banks can charge on loans, or pay on 
deposits, could be triggered by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s deci-
sion to cut or raise interest rates, and if so, it would be fair to say that 
the latter’s decision is dynamically incorporated through the Panama 
law.  But whether we call this or other variations on foreign currency 
adoption and pegging pure or merely near examples of horizontal dy-
namic incorporation, this class of decisions will likely involve the same 
sorts of costs and benefits as the more straightforward dynamic horizon-
tal adoption of foreign regulatory norms that existed in Israel pre-1955. 
As a practical matter, something reasonably close to dynamic hori-
zontal incorporation of regulatory norms is quite common within the 
United States.  On questions of state corporate law to which corporate 
codes do not spell out an answer in detail—matters such as the scope 
of the business judgment rule, for example—many states treat Dela-
ware law as persuasive precedent.80  Although I have found no exam-
ple of a state dynamically incorporating Delaware statutory or deci-
78 See MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, supra note 74. 
79 These include Eastern European countries, such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Lat-
via, id., as well as the fourteen African countries that use the CFA franc, which is itself 
pegged to the euro, id. at 30 tbl.6. 
80 See, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1459 n.22 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The 
Florida courts have relied upon Delaware corporate law to establish their own corpo-
rate doctrines.”); Vogel v. Mo. Valley Steel, Inc., 625 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Kan. 1981) 
(“The Kansas Corporation Code was patterned after the Delaware Corporation 
Code . . . and therefore, Delaware decisions interpreting its code are considered per-
suasive in our interpretation of the Kansas code.”); McMinn v. MBF Operating Acquisi-
tion Co., 164 P.3d 41, 53 (N.M. 2007) (looking to Delaware corporate law for guid-
ance, and citing cases from other states that do the same). 
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sional law as an official matter, we could readily imagine a state that 
hoped to replace Delaware as the corporate home for out-of-state cor-
porations doing just this and undercutting Delaware on registration 
fees.81  Indeed, it is something of a mystery why no state has tried do-
ing just that.82
III. REASONS FOR DYNAMIC INCORPORATION
This Part describes and evaluates three of the most likely reasons 
why a polity might find dynamic incorporation attractive.83  It consid-
ers three sorts of benefits that can flow from dynamic incorporation:  
avoiding unnecessary costs by free-riding on the lawmaking efforts of 
other polities; customizing the law to local conditions; and coordinat-
ing the efforts of actors in different jurisdictions.  Each of these justifi-
cations comes with attendant costs as well as benefits, so that the avail-
ability of a particular argument for dynamic incorporation in some 
context does not necessarily entail that dynamic incorporation is the 
81 Corporate-law scholars frequently point to Nevada as an example of a jurisdic-
tion that unsuccessfully attempted to supplant Delaware by copying its law.  See Jill E. 
Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (2000) (“In addition to adopting the Delaware statute, the Ne-
vada legislature adopted Delaware case law.  Moreover, courts construing Nevada law 
appear to follow Delaware precedent.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, To-
ward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 488 (1987) 
(“Nevada essentially has followed this course, adopting both the Delaware statutory 
and common law as it applies to corporations.”); see also William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law:  Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665 (1974) (describing Ne-
vada’s attempt “to become the western Delaware”).  Whatever these scholars may think 
Nevada did, the state did not, as a formal matter, dynamically incorporate Delaware 
law.  The authorities cited by the works listed in this footnote at most show that Nevada 
statically copied provisions of the relevant Delaware statute and that Delaware cases are 
persuasive precedent in Nevada.  For example, Jill Fisch characterizes Hilton Hotels 
Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1346-47 (D. Nev. 1997), as “explicitly finding that 
Nevada follows Delaware case law.”  Fisch, supra, at 1067 n.45.  In fact, this case only 
states that Delaware law is persuasive authority where no Nevada statutory or case law is 
on point.  With respect to actual incorporation (of laws, not companies!), the most 
that one can find in the Nevada case law is the statement that the Nevada statute, be-
cause it was based on a model act that was in turn rooted in Delaware and New York 
case law, statically incorporates Delaware (and New York) case law.  See Cohen v. Mirage 
Resorts, Inc., 62 P.3d 720, 726 n.10 (Nev. 2003) (invoking the “rule of statutory inter-
pretation that when a statute is derived from a sister state, it is presumedly adopted 
with the construction given it by the highest court of the sister state” (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted)). 
82 Perhaps the best explanation is that the Delaware courts enjoy a reputational 
advantage that an upstart rival would have great difficulty overcoming. 
83 This Part does not argue that these are the only three reasons that might be of-
fered in support of dynamic incorporation. 
2008] Dynamic Incorporation 133
best policy.  Where relevant, this Part distinguishes between circum-
stances justifying upward, downward, and horizontal dynamic incor-
poration.
A.  Avoiding Lawmaking Costs 
Lawmaking is often costly.  Where the institutional apparatus of 
lawmaking already exists, many of the costs—such as salaries, benefits, 
and expenses incurred by legislators and their staff, the cost of hold-
ing elections, and the building and maintenance of government office 
buildings—are essentially fixed.  The marginal cost of adding or 
amending the legislative code is small along these dimensions. 
However, legislation can have high marginal costs along other di-
mensions.  Suppose the legislature in Polity A wants to regulate pol-
lutants in drinking water.  Formulating a legal rule or standard that 
properly balances threats to human health against compliance costs 
requires a mix of normative judgments and technical expertise.  At a 
minimum, either the legislature itself or an administrative agency to 
which it delegates the task will need to undertake potentially expen-
sive scientific studies.  Saving these costs by writing law without ade-
quate investigation risks imposing unwarranted back-end costs from 
selecting a badly suboptimal rule. 
Alternatively, the legislature in Polity A could free-ride on work 
done in Polity B by simply adopting B’s rule or standard.  This ap-
proach is especially attractive if the law requires continual updating in 
light of new knowledge—as it plausibly might in an area like pollution 
regulation—because dynamic incorporation permits A’s legislature to 
make the one-time decision to depend on B’s law, and then to be 
done with the matter. 
To be sure, this strategy has drawbacks.  The circumstances of A
may differ substantially from those of B.  Perhaps A has a wetter cli-
mate than B, or B’s economy depends on water-intensive agricultural 
production to a greater extent than does A’s.  Or perhaps the people 
in A simply value economic growth more (or less) relative to human 
health than do the people of B.  These sorts of differences will require 
a dynamically (or, for that matter, a statically) incorporating polity 
like A to be careful in selecting a jurisdiction B to ensure that B is suf-
ficiently like A before borrowing its current and future law.  Legisla-
tors in A will also want to consider whether the law of C might not be a 
better choice than the law of B.
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Although these problems are real, they should not be overstated.  
Even if Polity A cannot find another polity with the identical mix of 
circumstances and values, the circumstances of some Polity B may be 
close enough to those of A that the savings that accrue to A from not 
having to create and continually amend its own substantive law more 
than compensate for the defects, if any, in B’s law relative to the law 
that A would ideally generate if left wholly to its own devices.  That will 
be especially true if A is a small polity and B a large one, as illustrated 
by the fact that the countries that choose to use either the U.S. dollar 
or the euro as their official currency, other than the countries that ac-
tually print the currency, tend to be quite small.84
In principle, dynamic incorporation of foreign law as a cost-saving 
device could proceed upwards, downwards, or horizontally.  So long as 
Polity A judges that the benefits of incorporating Polity B’s law out-
weigh the costs, it should not matter whether A is a subunit of B, B a 
subunit of A, or neither is a subunit of the other.  However, we are 
unlikely to see downward dynamic incorporation purely on cost-
savings grounds unless the subunit whose law is incorporated by the 
larger political entity has a greater capacity to generate optimal law 
than most other subunits and the larger political entity itself.85
When might that be true?  Conditions favorable to downward dy-
namic incorporation on cost-savings grounds could be found in any 
federal system in which a particular state government is thought to 
have special expertise in a given subject area.  In the United States, for 
example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 provide for a version 
of downward incorporation of California law, but only for those states 
that wish to follow California law, and this incorporation is subject to 
federal oversight.86
84 See MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, supra note 74, at 32 tbl.7. 
85 I consider downward dynamic incorporation as a means of accommodating di-
versity below.  See infra Part III.B (discussing circumstances where large political enti-
ties choose to devolve power to subunits in order to accommodate local preferences).  
Such downward incorporation often will produce cost savings, but that is not its sole 
justification.
86 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 209(b), 91 Stat. 755 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000)) (permitting any state that regulates automo-
bile emissions as strictly as the federal government to apply for a waiver, so long as the 
applying state regulated such emissions prior to March 30, 1966).  Because California 
is the only state that did so, it alone qualifies for the waiver.  However, the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1977 permit other states to adopt the California standards and 
thereby receive a waiver.  Id. § 7507. 
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In general, however, downward dynamic incorporation seems like 
a sensible strategy in a federal system with both a weak and/or under-
funded central government and one or a small number of powerful 
state governments.  Yet such federal systems will often be the product 
of historical bargains between geographically based ethnic groups 
with sufficient interethnic distrust that federal incorporation of the 
law of a dominant state would likely be politically infeasible.87  For ex-
ample, Belgian incorporation, and thus nationalization, of Flemish 
law, or Czechoslovakian incorporation of Czech law during the brief 
period between Czechoslovakia’s democratization and dissolution, 
would be unacceptable to the minority ethnic groups (principally Wal-
loons and Slovaks, respectively).88  Even static incorporation under 
such circumstances would usually be problematic, and thus dynamic 
incorporation, as a form of hegemony by one ethnic group over the 
other(s), would almost certainly be regarded with suspicion. 
Accordingly, we are most likely to see upward and horizontal dy-
namic incorporation, rather than downward incorporation, on labor-
saving grounds.  State tax codes that dynamically incorporate the fed-
eral definition of income (as well as other aspects of the Internal 
Revenue Code)89 provide an example of double savings.  First, by pig-
gybacking on the federal definition, the state legislature saves itself 
and its taxing authority the work of adjusting the law to changing cir-
cumstances.  Second, this version of dynamic incorporation creates 
cost savings for taxpayers.  Rather than having to calculate their in-
come (and possibly other terms prior to determining their tax liabil-
ity) once for their federal forms and a second time for their state 
forms, they can simply copy the result(s) from the federal form to the 
state form.  The time savings for state taxpayers are substantial, al-
though less so now than a generation ago given the widespread avail-
87 See Donald L. Horowitz, The Many Uses of Federalism, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 953, 957-
58 (2007) (arguing that federalism generally arises in states plagued by ethnic conflict 
only when potential or actual violence forces central governments to yield power to 
subunits).
88 See generally JOHN FITZMAURICE, THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: A UNIQUE FEDERAL-
ISM (1996) (noting that Belgium has developed a unique federal system that relies on a 
system of complex institutions through which the various regions may discuss and 
compromise on divisive issues rather than resort to violence); ERIC STEIN,
CZECHO/SLOVAKIA: ETHNIC CONFLICT, CONSTITUTIONAL FISSURE, NEGOTIATED 
BREAKUP (1997) (discussing the failed negotiations for a common state between 
Czechs and Slovaks in 1992 and the role of ethnic conflict in shaping the outcome). 
89 See supra note 14 (listing several state statutory and constitutional provisions that 
incorporate definitions from the Federal Internal Revenue Code into state income tax 
codes). 
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ability of inexpensive computer software that can use the same raw 
data to generate both federal and state returns. 
As in our schematic water-pollution example, so too here the 
benefits for state lawmakers and state citizens are not free.  Changes in 
federal tax law that become dynamically incorporated into state tax 
law may result in revenue losses unwanted by state lawmakers or in-
creased tax liability unwanted by state taxpayers.  Nonetheless, the 
widespread dynamic incorporation of federal tax law by state law90
shows that many states regard these risks as cost justified. 
As noted in Part II, true examples of horizontal dynamic incorpo-
ration are hard to find, but the examples that come closest—such as 
the adoption by a small polity of a larger polity’s currency—will typi-
cally be justified on cost-savings grounds.  Here, too, there is a trade-
off.  In accepting U.S. monetary policy as its own, Palau sacrifices the 
ability to expand or shrink its money supply in response to economic 
conditions specific to Palau,91 but the cost savings for a nation with a 
population that would just barely fill Madison Square Garden likely 
outweigh this sacrifice. 
Dynamic incorporation on cost-savings grounds will be especially 
attractive where the polity whose law will be incorporated has, or is 
perceived to have, special expertise in the relevant policy area.  U.S. 
states do not, as an official matter, dynamically incorporate the corpo-
rate law of Delaware, but they come close by treating Delaware corpo-
rate law decisions as especially persuasive precedent.92  Likewise, in 
developing the federal common law of contracts that applies to gov-
ernment contracts,93 the federal courts may pay special attention to 
the law of states (such as New York) that have the most extensively de-
veloped bodies of doctrine addressed to commercial matters.  To be 
clear, neither of these examples constitutes actual dynamic incorpora-
tion, as the target jurisdiction’s law is only deemed persuasive, and in-
corporation of Polity B’s judge-made law by the courts of Polity A
raises some questions not presented by legislative incorporation of 
foreign legislation.  Nonetheless, the examples demonstrate that ex-
pertise can be a reason to give some special place to the law of a for-
90 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
91 Supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
93 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (holding 
that federal common law governs federal contracts in suits by or against the federal 
government).
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eign jurisdiction.  Dynamic incorporation based on expertise simply 
takes the point one (admittedly large) step further. 
The arguments thus far considered for dynamic incorporation on 
cost-savings and expertise grounds are all specific to particular policy 
domains.  However, the logic of cost savings may entail dissolution of 
the polity entirely, and the fear of that logical consequence in turn 
may lead polities to use upward dynamic incorporation less frequently 
than simple cost-benefit analysis would counsel. 
Consider Scotland.  From the early eighteenth century through 
1999, Scots voted in local elections and for ministers in the Parliament 
of Great Britain, but had no Parliament of their own.94  In the debate 
leading up to the 1997 referendum that resulted in a Scottish Parlia-
ment, the opposition emphasized cost (among other things).  Run-
ning a government would be expensive, opponents argued, and the 
money spent on the mechanics of a new layer of legislative govern-
ment could be better spent on the provision of services or rebated 
through lower taxes.95  That argument lost in the court of public opin-
ion, as the referendum passed by a three-to-one margin.96
Now suppose that on some particular issue as to which formal 
competence has been devolved to the Scottish Parliament, a Scottish 
Member of Parliament (MP) argues that formulating the appropriate 
legal standard would be too costly and that Great Britain as a whole is 
similarly situated to Scotland.  Accordingly, this MP suggests that the 
Scottish Parliament should dynamically incorporate the British rule or 
standard.  We can readily imagine other MPs rising to argue that the 
creation of the Scottish Parliament rules out this sort of “de-
devolution.”  Such an argument would rely on the very existence of 
the polity’s own lawmaking bodies (which for these purposes include 
administrative agencies to which responsibility for promulgating regu-
lations with the force of law might be delegated) as a reason why the 
substantive decisions must be made within the polity—even if deci-
sions that are, by hypothesis, better would be reached by dynamic in-
corporation of the larger polity’s law. 
94 See generally T.M. DEVINE, THE SCOTTISH NATION: A HISTORY, 1700-2000 (1999) 
(recounting Scottish history from 1707 to the meeting of the first Scottish Parliament 
in July of 1999). 
95 See Sarah Lyall, With Gusto, Scots Say ‘Yes’ to Setting Up Parliament, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1997, at A3 (“Opponents of a new parliament in Scotland, in the ‘Think 
Twice’ campaign led by the Conservative Party, have argued that it would saddle Scot-
land with new expenses [and] result in far higher taxes . . . .”). 
96 Id.
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The argument that I have placed in the mouths of the hypotheti-
cal opponents of the hypothetical dynamic incorporation of British 
law is available in any polity as an objection to upward incorporation.  
“We Oklahomans have our own legislature for a reason,” the argu-
ment goes, “and thus even if Oklahoma would be better served by dy-
namically incorporating federal law, that would be an abdication of 
our responsibility to legislate for the state.”  As noted in the Introduc-
tion, in some U.S. states, this reasoning operates as a state constitu-
tional bar to dynamic incorporation,97 but even in states in which the 
practice is not per se forbidden, the argument from the existence of 
state lawmaking power may be invoked to resist particular efforts at 
dynamic incorporation.
To be clear, I am not saying that those who invoke the existence 
of lawmaking institutions as an argument against upward (or for that 
matter, any) dynamic incorporation are correct.  I am only noting that 
the very existence of government institutions at any level of govern-
ment will often tug against a decision to engage in dynamic incorpo-
ration.  The loss—or even the perception of loss—of direct account-
ability for the law within the polity proper will count as a cost of 
dynamic incorporation.  For some, this cost will be seen as so high 
that no benefit will justify incurring it, while for others it will merely 
be thrown into the mix of overall costs and benefits.  For anyone who 
feels the tug of what might be called the “argument from the exis-
tence of government,” the argument counters claims that cost savings 
justify dynamic incorporation as well as other sorts of justifications for 
dynamic incorporation.  The balance of this Part examines two such 
other justifications for dynamic incorporation without separately rais-
ing the argument from the existence of government as an objection to 
each, though each is vulnerable to that argument. 
B.  Accommodating Local Diversity Through Customization 
Large political entities sometimes find it advantageous to devolve 
power to their subunits.  By permitting the law of the subunit to fill 
gaps in or to entirely supply the law on particular issues, the larger 
unit customizes the law to diverse local conditions and preferences.  
Dynamic incorporation in this context permits the subunits to play the 
97 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (enumerating twelve states that clearly 
forbid dynamic incorporation of federal law as an unlawful delegation of lawmaking 
authority, and three other states that forbid dynamic incorporation with limited excep-
tions). 
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primary regulatory role in many substantive areas.  Thus, even as devo-
lution through dynamic incorporation decreases the reach of the lar-
ger polity, it increases the democratic character of the system as a 
whole.  In addition to matching policy to circumstances, devolution 
also tends to encourage experimentation, which can in turn yield new 
solutions that are then available for additional subunits or the polity as 
a whole.  This set of arguments for downward dynamic incorporation 
closely parallels a familiar set of arguments for decentralization as a 
more general matter.98
As noted in the Introduction, within the United States there are 
numerous examples of federal law rendering state law applicable 
within the state or within some class of cases to which state law ap-
plies.99  These include the Conformity Act, which, prior to the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, required federal courts to 
apply the procedural law of the states in which they respectively sat,100
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which makes state privilege law appli-
cable in federal court where state law provides the rule of decision,101
and the Assimilative Crimes Act, which incorporates the criminal law 
of the state in which federal land is located.102  More broadly, Justice 
Scalia was surely right in his observation that “there is nothing un-
usual about having the applicability of a federal statute depend on the 
content of state law.”103
Here, a digression on American constitutional doctrine will illu-
minate the broader phenomenon of downward dynamic incorpora-
tion.  The constitutionality of downward dynamic incorporation by the 
federal government was not firmly established until 1957, when the 
Supreme Court upheld the Assimilative Crimes Act in United States v. 
98 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-89 (1998) (arguing that a model of decentralized gov-
ernment allows localities to address particular concerns while learning from the ex-
perience of their neighbors, encourages experimentation and reform, and enables 
citizens to directly participate in service provision and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
local government institutions). 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19 (providing examples of federal law dy-
namically incorporating state law). 
100 Supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
101 FED. R. EVID. 501 (“[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.”). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). 
103 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 35 n.* (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 
457, 464-465 (1967) and Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 
(1988) as prior examples). 
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Sharpnack.104  Even then, neither the Court nor the appellee’s brief 105
cited the best authority for the proposition that federal law cannot dy-
namically incorporate state law. 
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, Justice Curtis, speaking for the Court, 
upheld an 1803 Pennsylvania law that required the use of local pilots, 
thereby refusing to rely on a 1789 federal statute purporting to au-
thorize state and local harbor laws.106  Justice Curtis made clear that 
Congress could have statically incorporated state law, but asserted 
that—at least if a power were exclusively federal—the federal govern-
ment could not, in the exercise of that power, dynamically incorpo-
rate state law.107  He concluded:  “If the Constitution excluded the 
States from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress 
cannot regrant, or in any manner reconvey to the States that 
power.”108
To be sure, this was dicta, because the Court held in Cooley that 
the Constitution did not “exclude[] the States from making any law 
regulating commerce.”109  The case was important for establishing the 
proposition that, with the exception of the ill-defined category of ob-
jects of regulation that “are in their nature national, or admit only of 
one uniform system, or plan of regulation,”110 states have concurrent 
power to regulate commerce, unless and until Congress preempts 
their regulations.  And because Cooley upheld what amounted to a 
devolution of power from Congress to the states in effect not unlike 
104 355 U.S. 286 (1958). 
105 Brief for Appellee, Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (No. 35), 1957 WL 87702. 
106 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
107 The Court stated,  
 If the law of Pennsylvania, now in question, had been in existence at the 
date of this act of Congress, we might hold it to have been adopted by Con-
gress, and thus made a law of the United States, and so valid.  Because this act 
does, in effect, give the force of an act of Congress, to the then existing State 
laws on this subject, so long as they should continue unrepealed by the State 
which enacted them.
 But the law on which these actions are founded was not enacted till 
1803. . . .  
 If the States were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the 
grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not con-
fer upon them power thus to legislate.  
Id. at 317-18. 
108 Id. at 318. 
109 Id.
110 Id. at 319. 
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the devolution accomplished by the Assimilative Crimes Act, it is not 
really surprising that, in the days before computer-based legal re-
search, the appellee’s lawyer in Sharpnack (apparently a solo practitio-
ner arguing his only Supreme Court case) did not think to look to 
Cooley for support. 
But we have no such excuse, and so we should face the question of 
whether Justice Curtis and the Cooley Court were right in 1851 or 
whether the Sharpnack Court was right over a century later:  does the 
Constitution permit Congress to dynamically incorporate downward 
when it exercises an exclusive federal power (as Congress does pursu-
ant to the Territories Clause of Article IV, Section 3, when, as under 
the Assimilative Crimes Act, it makes law for federal territories)? 
History and precedent would appear to be on the side of the 
Sharpnack Court.  In addition to the passage by the first Congress of 
the federal act at issue in Cooley—which, on its face, incorporates state 
law dynamically rather than just statically111—the Conformity Act of 
1872 (admittedly adopted after the Cooley decision) expressly dis-
placed a regime of static conformity to state procedure under the 
Process Act of 1792112 with a regime of “dynamic conformity.”113
Moreover, as the Sharpnack Court itself noted, numerous other federal 
statutes in force by 1957 dynamically incorporated state law.114
Did Justice Curtis nonetheless have logic on his side?  Consider a 
Constitution like that of Germany, which divides federal subject mat-
ter competencies into two categories:  those over which the federal 
government exercises exclusive authority115 and those over which the 
111 The Act provided:  
 [t]hat all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United 
States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of 
the States, respectively, wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the 
States may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, until further legislative pro-
vision shall be made by Congress.   
Id. at 317 (emphasis added) (quoting Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, § 4, 1 Stat. 53, 54). 
112 Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 275, 276; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 605-07 (5th 
ed. 2003) (noting that the Process Act “adopted the state law ‘as it existed in Septem-
ber, 1789 . . . not as it might afterwards be made’” (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825))). 
113 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 112, at 607 (“The Conformity Act eliminated the 
anachronism of federal adherence to no-longer-existent state practice.”). 
114 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294-97 (1958). 
115 See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Federal Con-
stitution] art. 73, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
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Länder and the federal government exercise concurrent authority.116
Now suppose that, within an area of exclusive federal competence, the 
national legislature enacts a law purporting to dynamically incorpo-
rate Länder law.  This certainly looks like an effort to reclassify an ex-
clusively federal power as a concurrent power.  Thus it would likely be 
unconstitutional were it not for another provision of the German 
Constitution, which expressly empowers the federal government to 
delegate lawmaking authority to the Länder even with respect to sub-
jects within exclusive federal jurisdiction.117  Were it not for that addi-
tional provision, however, it would be a fair inference that exclusive 
federal powers are not delegable to the Länder.
Likewise, where the U.S. Constitution clearly delineates a power as 
exclusively federal, dynamic incorporation of state law would appear 
to be forbidden.  Only one provision of the Constitution expressly 
confers an “exclusive” power.  Article I authorizes Congress to “exer-
cise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” with respect to the 
capital district.118  Nonetheless, Congress has granted (and taken away 
and regranted) the District of Columbia varying degrees of “home 
rule” over the course of its existence.119  In 1953, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that such home rule violates the constitutional 
requirement of exclusively federal legislation, observing “that the 
word ‘exclusive’ was employed to eliminate any possibility that the leg-
islative power of Congress over the District was to be concurrent with 
that of the ceding states.”120  Thus, the Constitution’s grant of “exclu-
supra note 35, at 27 (enumerating areas in which the federal government has “exclu-
sive power to legislate”). 
116 See id. art. 74, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra note 35, at 29 (extending “[c]oncurrent legislative powers” to enumerated sub-
jects).
117 Article 71 of the German Constitution provides that “[o]n matters within the 
exclusive legislative powers of the Federation, the Länder shall have the power to legis-
late only when and to the extent that they are expressly authorized to do so by a fed-
eral law.”  Id. art. 71, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra note 35, at 26. 
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
119 For a brief history of the relationship between Washington, D.C. and the fed-
eral government, see Note, Democracy or Distrust?  Restoring Home Rule for the District of 
Columbia in the Post–Control Board Era, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2045, 2046-51 (1998). 
120 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953) (citing 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 ( James Madison); 3 DEBATES 432-433 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1897); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1218 (4th ed. 1873)). 
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sive” power is not delegable to the states in this context, but mostly 
because no state has a clear interest. 
Naturalization and bankruptcy provide additional examples of po-
tentially nondelegable powers.  Article I empowers Congress “[t]o es-
tablish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”121  A federal 
naturalization or bankruptcy law that made the law of each state op-
erative in its own territory would seem to violate the requirement of 
uniformity.  Note, however, that even static federal incorporation of 
the law of fifty different states would violate uniformity on this theory.  
Conversely, a federal law that dynamically incorporated the law of a 
single state and made it applicable to the nation as a whole would not
be objectionable on disuniformity grounds.  Accordingly, these uni-
formity requirements do not provide a very good test of the question 
of whether exclusive federal power precludes dynamic, territorially 
based incorporation of state law. 
In fact, it turns out that federal bankruptcy law does dynamically 
incorporate the law of the several states, thus seeming to violate the 
uniformity requirement.  Although the Bankruptcy Code begins by 
defining terms,122 even a casual perusal of those terms makes obvious 
that these terms are, in turn, defined by reference to relationships 
that the Federal Code does not itself define but that take their sub-
stance from state law.  For example, although the Code defines a 
“domestic support obligation,” that definition relies on the underlying 
law of domestic relations.123  In principle, Congress, in enacting the 
Bankruptcy Code, could have intended for the federal courts to de-
velop a freestanding federal law of domestic relations applicable in 
bankruptcy cases—and the Supreme Court has sometimes asserted 
that there is a presumption in favor of federal definitions of federal 
statutory terms.124  But such statements cannot be taken at face value.  
Although the development of federal standards in principle promotes 
the uniformity of federal law, where, as in the Bankruptcy Code and 
elsewhere, federal law assumes an existing set of legal relationships, 
121 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
122 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
123 See id. § 101(14A). 
124 See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (“Congress when it enacts 
a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.”); see 
also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (starting with 
the general assumption that the legislature does not intend for a statutory term of a 
federal act to be given content by the application of state law). 
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federal uniformity comes at the unacceptably high cost of almost ran-
dom unpredictability.  Must federal bankruptcy courts develop federal 
standards governing alimony, divorce, guardianship, and separation 
(to name just four legal relations and obligations to which one of over 
fifty definitional sections of the Bankruptcy Code refers)?  And to 
what end?  Whatever the merits of the outcomes reached in the cases 
in which the Supreme Court has broadly (and blithely) asserted the 
presumption in favor of federal definitions, surely the Justices were 
closer to the mark when they said,  
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that 
does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather 
than federal law.  This is especially true where a statute deals with a fa-
milial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is 
primarily a matter of state concern.
125
To be clear, I am making a normative claim that federal law should 
not be interpreted so as to require the formulation of federal defini-
tions for all of the legal relationships, rights, and duties to which it re-
fers,126 but I am also making a descriptive claim:  federal law frequently 
builds on state law as it finds it at the moment of application.  In other 
words, in many instances federal law dynamically incorporates state 
law.  And that is true even of nominally uniform federal law—such as 
the federal law of bankruptcy. 
Could it be otherwise?  Once we recognize that in many instances 
federal law will incorporate state law rather than supply all of its own 
terms, can we say with confidence that it does so dynamically rather 
than statically?  We can.  Despite the enormous growth of the federal 
government since its founding, Herbert Wechsler’s 1954 observation 
remains largely true even in 2008:  “[F]ederal law is still a largely in-
terstitial product, rarely occupying any field completely, building nor-
mally upon legal relationships established by the states.”127  When 
Wechsler said, accurately, that federal law builds on these state-
125 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (citation omitted). 
126 For an instructive discussion of the materials relevant to the normative ques-
tion, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 112, at 723-24. 
127 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 545 (1954).  
But see FALLON ET AL., supra note 112, at 495 (observing that “today one finds many 
more instances in which federal enactments supply both right and remedy in, or 
wholly occupy, a particular field,” but wondering whether Wechsler’s thesis, which was 
also espoused by Henry Hart, “does not remain accurate over an extremely broad 
range of applications”). 
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defined legal relationships—including such fundamental matters as 
contracts,128 family relations,129 and property130—what he meant was 
that federal law dynamically incorporates state law. 
Incorporation of state law in such circumstances must be dynamic 
in order for the incorporation to achieve one of its central purposes:  
to layer federal law on top of the operative state law in any given case.  
Static incorporation would require keeping track of the operative dates 
of federal law and the law of each state, with incongruous results.  It 
would require, among other things, a determination of which amend-
ments to federal law reset the clock for purposes of incorporation.131
Dynamic incorporation also makes more sense than static incor-
poration as a matter of congressional intent.  Consider a tax example:  
federal law treats punitive, but not most compensatory, damages for 
personal injuries as part of gross income.132  Subject to federal consti-
tutional limits, state law defines when punitive damages are allowed 
and where the line lies between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages.  To some extent, the distinction is a matter of labeling be-
cause juries may base their awards on a gestalt reaction to the facts of 
the case, rather than a careful parsing of the differences among eco-
nomic damages, compensatory noneconomic damages, and punitive 
128 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) 
(“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter [under the 
Federal Arbitration Act], courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles 
that govern the formation of contracts.”). 
129 See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-53 n.8 (1977) (enumerating several 
provisions of the Social Security Act that incorporate marital status as defined by state 
law); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (conditioning enti-
tlement to insurance benefits on state law determinations of whether children are le-
gitimate); Purganan v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 269, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a 
California law on marriage annulment affects insurance benefits under the Social Se-
curity Act). 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“The federal tax lien 
statute itself ‘creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally 
defined, to rights created under state law.’” (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 
55 (1958))). 
131 For an excellent discussion of this difficulty in the context of a purportedly 
nonsubstantive change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Edward A. Hart-
nett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155 (2006). 
132 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).  The evident object of the distinction is clear.  Be-
cause the law does not tax imputed income from healthy bodies, damages for the loss 
of healthy bodies should not be treated as income.  Note, however, that the law also 
does not tax imputed income from emotional well-being, but damages for emotional 
distress are only partially exempt from gross income.  See id. § 104(a). 
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damages.133  Nonetheless, these labels matter for federal tax purposes.  
But is it reasonable to suppose that, when Congress chose to accord 
significance to the state-drawn line between punitive and most com-
pensatory damages, it meant to adopt the lines as they existed in each 
of the fifty states at the moment of enactment of the federal law—an 
administrative nightmare—or the line as it exists in particular verdicts 
based on the state law as it stands at the moment of that verdict, even 
if that state law became operative after the relevant provision of the 
federal tax law? 
The pervasiveness of federal dynamic incorporation of state law 
shows that Justice Curtis was not merely wrong in his Cooley dictum 
denying the federal government this power, but very wrong.  Or if he 
was right, he was right only as to the almost vanishingly small category 
of truly exclusive federal powers.  A federal law that dynamically in-
corporated state law with respect to some aspect of foreign affairs—
“incorporating” Massachusetts law regarding transactions with firms 
conducting business in Burma/Myanmar,134 say—might violate the 
principle that in the exercise of its truly exclusive federal powers, 
Congress cannot dynamically incorporate state law.  But such exotic 
examples aside, a federal system in which federal law is interstitial in 
the way that Wechsler described cannot operate effectively without 
dynamically incorporating state law willy-nilly. 
C.  Coordination and Reciprocity 
Dynamic incorporation of foreign law can be a powerful mecha-
nism for solving coordination problems and ensuring reciprocal com-
pliance with agreements among sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns.  By 
contrast with static incorporation, dynamic incorporation ensures that 
initial efforts at coordination do not drift apart over time. 
Consider, first, a common alternative mechanism for achieving 
coordination among various jurisdictions:  the adoption by each of a 
“uniform” or “model” code.  The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
is a leading example.  Originally promulgated in 1952 and revised pe-
riodically since then, some version of the UCC is in force in all fifty 
133 Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages 
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005) (finding that caps on noneconomic damages lead 
to higher awards for economic damages). 
134 Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366-67 (2000) (finding 
that federal law preempted a Massachusetts law that prohibited that state’s agencies 
from doing business in Burma). 
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states.135  States adopting the UCC may do so for one or both of two 
principal reasons:  First, the legislature in a given state may conclude 
that the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws—the bodies responsible for 
writing and updating the UCC (and other uniform laws)—have 
greater expertise than legislators in drafting appropriate laws to gov-
ern commercial affairs.  Second, given the large number of commer-
cial transactions that cross state lines, states may conclude that uni-
form rules are preferable to custom-tailored rules.  Even if State X
could enact a code that was superior to the UCC, the State X legisla-
ture might nonetheless conclude that the advantages of a set of uni-
form rules outweigh the disadvantages arising out of the (assumed) 
suboptimality of the UCC rules.  Accordingly, many states simply 
adopt the UCC or individual articles thereof. 
However, not every state adopts every article of the UCC, and 
states sometimes adopt parts of the UCC with changes chosen by their 
individual legislatures.136  Moreover, even if every state has adopted an 
article of the UCC,137 individual states do so statically.  How to inter-
pret a provision of the UCC in Wisconsin is a question of Wisconsin 
law, while how to interpret the identical language in Minnesota is a 
question of Minnesota law.  Ceteris paribus, in order to maintain uni-
formity, state courts may prefer interpretations adopted by the courts 
135 See U.C.C. Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 1 U.L.A. 1-
2 (2004). 
136 For example, U.C.C. § 2-302 (2007) sets forth a standard for an unconscionable 
contract or clause.  Forty-eight states have adopted section 2-302 in order to regulate 
the perceived fairness of contracts.  Ronald L. Hersbergen, Unconscionability:  The Ap-
proach of the Louisiana Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REV. 1315, 1315, 1317 (1983).  California has 
not adopted the UCC’s unconscionability provision, but instead applies its own “judi-
cially imposed” unconscionability doctrine.  See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 
P.2d 165, 172-78 (Cal. 1981) (per curiam) (observing that a contract may be adjudged 
unconscionable and deemed unenforceable if it does not fall within the reasonable 
expectations of the weaker party or if it is unduly oppressive).  Louisiana, on the other 
hand, does not expressly impose any unconscionability limit.  See, e.g., Iberia Credit 
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th Cir. 2004) (“No section 
of the Louisiana Civil Code directly addresses, in so many words, the doctrine of un-
conscionability or the related concept of adhesionary contracts.”); La. Power & Light 
Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596, 598 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (“The Louisiana courts have 
not to date adopted the theory of adhesion contracts.”). 
137 According to the website of the Uniform Law Commissioners, every state (as 
well as the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands) has adopted Article 9 of 
the UCC, governing secured transactions.  See Uniform Law Comm’rs, A Few Facts 
about the Revised UCC Article 9, Secured Transactions (1999) (2002), 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca9.asp (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
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of their sister states, but this is at best an imperfect strategy for main-
taining uniformity.  Different fact patterns will arise in different or-
ders in different states, and thus lines of doctrine interpreting uni-
form but somewhat ambiguous language may diverge over time.  More 
fundamentally, since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,138 American lawyers 
and judges have understood state law (whether common law or statu-
tory) as validating distinctive state authority rather than some general 
law.  Despite its name, the Uniform Commercial Code can never be 
fully uniform. 
If respectful consideration of the persuasive precedents of foreign 
jurisdictions is an imperfect method of achieving harmonization, dy-
namic incorporation marks an improvement.  Suppose that instead of 
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, Minnesota were to dynami-
cally incorporate Wisconsin’s version of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, along with its authoritative interpretation by the Wisconsin 
courts.  Now there would be a self-correcting limit to drift.  On ques-
tions of first impression, the Minnesota courts would either interpret 
the UCC according to their own best judgment or, following the prac-
tice of federal courts when called upon to make rulings of state law, 
attempt to predict how the Wisconsin Supreme Court would rule on 
the question.139  But once the Wisconsin Supreme Court actually ruled 
on some question arising under the UCC, that ruling would be bind-
ing in Minnesota.  The commercial law would remain uniform be-
tween Wisconsin and Minnesota. 
In practice, it is difficult to imagine one state delegating so much 
authority to another state in this manner, and harder still to imagine 
forty-nine states delegating such authority to just one—although the 
persuasive weight given to Delaware corporate law comes fairly close 
in practice.  As noted above, setting aside special cases involving the 
application of external law to travelers and conflicts of law, true in-
stances of horizontal dynamic incorporation are difficult to find. 
More commonly, polities looking for a mechanism to keep their 
law synchronized will dynamically incorporate upward the law of some 
larger political entity.  Multilateral treaties can serve this purpose.  
Each member state signs onto the treaty and makes the law of the lar-
ger entity part of its own law—or, what amounts to much the same 
138 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
139 See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting, but not on this point) (“[W]here the state law is unsettled . . . the courts’ 
task is to try to predict how the highest court of that State would decide the question.”). 
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thing, makes the law of the larger entity superior to its own law and 
enforceable in its own courts. 
We might regard the U.S. Constitution itself as a leading example 
of this sort of upward dynamic incorporation for the purpose of solv-
ing coordination problems and ensuring reciprocal compliance with 
mutually beneficial agreements among sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns.  
The states granted to the national government the power, among 
other things, to regulate interstate commerce.  And through the Su-
premacy Clause, actions of the federal government in this and other 
domains of its policy competence were made both superior to con-
trary state law and enforceable within state courts.140  Thus, the Consti-
tution gave the states a mechanism to achieve uniformity in interstate 
commercial regulation and to avoid costly trade wars. 
The example of the U.S. Constitution also highlights an important 
feature of dynamic incorporation.  Where there is a real possibility 
that issues of interpretation will arise over time, in order for the origi-
nal act of incorporation to count as truly dynamic, there must be some 
mechanism for coordinating subsequent interpretations.  Typically, 
that mechanism will be submission of contested questions to a single 
tribunal whose rulings will be binding on the courts of the incorporat-
ing polities.  In the early nineteenth century, the highest court of Vir-
ginia took the position that its interpretation of the federal Constitu-
tion was no less authoritative than the interpretation provided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Unsurprisingly, the latter Court 
concluded that its own interpretation was binding, principally relying 
on an argument rooted in the need for uniform interpretation of fed-
eral law.141  Many years later, Justice Holmes famously remarked that 
this ruling was essential to the preservation of the Union.142
Thus, we might conclude that, in general, parties entering a multi-
lateral agreement aimed at overcoming coordination problems should 
also establish some body to issue authoritative decisions resolving 
questions arising out of ambiguities in the agreement.  This aim might 
140 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
141 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (invoking 
the “necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States”). 
142 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
291, 295-96 (1920) (“I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost 
our power to declare an Act of Congress void.  I do think the Union would be imper-
iled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”). 
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be accomplished by the creation of a legislature, an administrative 
body, a court, or some combination.  But whatever the nature of the 
body or bodies, they will only confer on the parties the benefits of true 
dynamic incorporation if their pronouncements are effectively bind-
ing within the legal systems of the agreeing parties.  At the same time, 
however, bestowing the power to make binding rules of law on a body 
that is in substantial part beyond the control of the polity granting the 
power at issue renders dynamic incorporation potentially problematic 
on delegation or sovereignty grounds. 
*      *      * 
The foregoing catalogue of the sorts of reasons why a polity might 
dynamically incorporate the law of another jurisdiction (whether up, 
down, or horizontally) is not meant to be exhaustive.  Other grounds 
can be adduced in particular circumstances.  For example, states that 
require their high courts to interpret their respective constitutions in 
“lockstep” with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of parallel 
provisions of the Federal Constitution may do so for substantive ideo-
logical reasons:  because states are already bound (under the incorpo-
ration doctrine) to apply the Supreme Court’s interpretation of most 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, a lockstep requirement can be a 
means of preventing a liberal state high court from interpreting the 
state constitution to provide for additional rights.143  Or the ideologi-
cal valence could be reversed.  In circumstances in which state judicial 
“overprotection” of rights leads to conservative results—for example, 
by interpreting a state equal-protection requirement to ban affirma-
tive action programs, regulatory takings, or gun-control laws that the 
Federal Constitution would permit—a lockstep requirement will pre-
vent a conservative state high court from invalidating liberal state 
policies that the federal courts would uphold. 
A lockstep requirement may not typically be understood as a form 
of dynamic incorporation because the operative constitutional norm 
already operates of its own force.  This way of viewing the matter, 
however, is misleading.  The rights-protective element of a Supreme 
143 For example, the Florida Legislature introduced the “lockstep” approach to 
search-and-seizure cases after concern that the Florida Supreme Court was overly lib-
eral and defense oriented.  See Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law:  Ex-
ploring the Limits of Florida’s “Forced Linkage” Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 666-73 
(1987) (describing the political background to the adoption of Article 1, Section 12 of 
the Florida Constitution). 
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Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of 
Rights operates against the states of its own force, but the rights-
denying element does not.  For example, suppose a state court would, 
if left to its own devices, interpret state constitutional limits on 
searches and seizures to require probable cause and a warrant before 
the police may search a person’s garbage.  But instead, on the author-
ity of U.S. Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment,144 the state court holds that such police activity does not 
constitute a “search.”  In this situation, the state court has—in virtue 
of the lockstep requirement—limited the freedom of the state’s citi-
zens via dynamic incorporation. 
This last example shows how dynamic incorporation can be used 
to limit “negative” freedom, or “freedom from” government action.  
Dynamic incorporation can, of course, also enhance such negative 
freedom.  For example, a polity that chooses to dynamically incorpo-
rate the human-rights law of a body that, over time, tends to afford 
more and more protection for more and more liberties, increases its 
citizens’ liberties (assuming that, absent dynamic incorporation, the 
polity would not have taken such steps directly).  Thus, there is no 
necessary connection between dynamic incorporation and negative 
liberty.
By contrast, with one important exception, dynamic incorporation 
systematically reduces the “positive liberty” of a polity’s citizens by tak-
ing key decisions away from the organs of that polity.145  That is simply 
a restatement of the point noted above in Part I:  even when cost justi-
fied, dynamic incorporation undermines democratic self-government 
within the polity doing the incorporating.  The one exception is that 
where dynamic incorporation places limits on countermajoritarian in-
stitutions within a polity—as in the example of lockstep requirements 
for state constitutional provisions that might otherwise be used to in-
validate internal legislation—those limits may have the effect of em-
powering democratic institutions within the dynamically incorporat-
144 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (holding that police in-
spection of garbage bags left on a curb did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
“search” requiring a warrant and probable cause, while conceding that “[i]ndividual 
States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent con-
straints on police conduct”). 
145 On the difference between negative and positive liberty, see ISAIAH BERLIN,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191, 203-06 (Henry Hardy & 
Roger Hausheer eds., 1997).  For a related typology, see Benjamin Constant, The Lib-
erty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns (1819), in POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 307 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988). 
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ing polity.  As the next Part explains, there are also other potentially 
important differences between dynamic incorporation of decisions by 
politically accountable executive and legislative actors, on the one 
hand, and dynamic incorporation of decisions by politically unac-
countable judicial actors, on the other. 
IV. THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF DYNAMIC INCORPORATION
Thus far, this Article has argued that dynamic incorporation of 
foreign law raises a prima facie threat to democratic values, that, ce-
teris paribus, the threat is roughly proportional to the difficulty of re-
voking the decision to dynamically incorporate foreign law and that 
the attendant costs and benefits of dynamically incorporating upward, 
downward, or horizontally will vary greatly based on context, includ-
ing the justification for dynamic incorporation.  This Part addresses a 
tension raised by the foregoing analysis.  To attain some of the bene-
fits of dynamic incorporation—especially the benefits of coordination 
and reciprocity from multilateral upward incorporation—polities will 
often need to make firm commitments, that is, to make a decision to 
engage in dynamic incorporation practically irrevocable.  In other 
words, the benefits of some kinds of dynamic incorporation will flow 
precisely when such incorporation poses the greatest threat to democ-
ratic values. 
This Part first argues that political representation of the dynami-
cally incorporating polity (or representation of its citizens) within the 
polity whose laws are incorporated can compensate for the loss of lo-
cal democratic control that irrevocable or nearly irrevocable dynamic 
incorporation entails.  For example, the EU provides for representa-
tion of its member states in the Presidency and the Commission, as 
well as elections to its Parliament.  Thus, when a member state agrees 
to make EU law enforceable as its own law in domestic courts, it dy-
namically incorporates law that is, in an important sense, not fully for-
eign.  Political safeguards at the EU level substitute for the exercise of 
sovereignty at the member-state level. 
This Part next asks whether this strategy—which I call the political 
safeguards of dynamic incorporation146—can be successfully employed 
146 The term “political safeguards” is meant to evoke a well-known article by Her-
bert Wechsler, in which he suggested that the U.S. Constitution’s principal protections 
against the erosion of state sovereignty could be found in the representation of the 
states as political units in the federal government itself.  See Wechsler, supra note 127, 
at 559.  The Supreme Court has relied on the notion of political safeguards to avoid 
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when the body formulating law to be incorporated is a court.  Does 
dynamic incorporation of judge-made law pose a threat to democratic 
values, and if so, can the threat be mitigated by representation within 
a court?  How one answers these questions may depend on how one 
understands the nature of adjudication. 
A.  Representation as Remedy 
Suppose that some number of sovereign polities wish to enter into 
a mutually beneficial agreement to create a suprasovereign body that 
will have the power to make laws binding on and in their respective 
polities.  Perhaps the contracting sovereign parties wish to create a 
common economic market so as to discourage trade wars and to har-
monize regulations.  Or perhaps they wish to avoid the race-to-the-
bottom dynamic that can undermine the incentive of any single polity 
to enact strong protections for workers’ rights or the natural envi-
ronment.  Whatever the driving force behind the quest for coordina-
tion, each polity faces a dilemma:  to secure the advantages of the 
agreement it must be irrevocable or nearly so, but as we saw in Part I, 
the greater the obstacles to repeal of an act or treaty dynamically in-
corporating foreign law, the greater the threat to democracy. 
Formalism poses a tempting potential solution to this problem.  
An incorporating polity can decline, as a matter of internal law, to give 
direct effect to the suprasovereign body’s decrees.  This is not neces-
sarily a toothless gesture.  In the United States, for example, treaties—
searching judicial scrutiny of laws challenged as intruding into the sovereign preroga-
tives of states. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 
(1985) (“[T]he composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to 
protect the States from overreaching by Congress.” (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); D. Bruce La Pierre, The 
Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux:  Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents 
of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982); Wechsler, supra note 127)).  Decisions since 
the 1990s, however, indicate a greater willingness on the Court’s part to find judicially 
enforceable safeguards for federalism as well.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (striking down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act 
that allowed victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their attackers in federal court 
because Congress may not “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based 
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce”); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the Brady Act, which required state law-
enforcement officials to conduct background checks of gun buyers, offended state sov-
ereignty); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (invalidating the Federal 
Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause).  For a reformulation of Wechsler’s thesis emphasizing the role of state and 
national political parties, see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
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whether they empower future lawmaking by a supranational body or 
merely express nominally static norms—are effectively presumed to be 
non-self-executing; that is, only the implementing legislation has in-
ternal effect (absent evidence to the contrary in the treaty text or per-
haps the travaux prepatoire).147  And in the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, Congress even took the step of forbidding any person from rely-
ing directly on the Geneva Conventions for a claim of right,148 adding 
further that in construing the implementing legislation, U.S. courts 
could not even take guidance from foreign or international deci-
sions.149
However, formally denying direct effect in Polity A to suprana-
tional legislation and decisions can readily backfire.  Because (by hy-
pothesis) the main point of the intersovereign agreement is to bind 
the parties, the other potential signatories will not accept A’s acces-
sion to the agreement if that accession does not actually commit A to 
incorporate the legislation or decisions of the suprasovereign body it 
creates. 
To be sure, there will be circumstances in which, as a formal mat-
ter, Polity A neither makes the suprasovereign body’s legislation or 
judgments directly enforceable domestically nor renders its accession 
to the intersovereign agreement formally irrevocable, but other fac-
tors may assure the remaining sovereign parties of A’s ongoing com-
pliance.  The status of the decisions of panels of the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in U.S. law provides an interesting example.  A 
decision by a WTO panel or appellate body that some U.S. law or pol-
icy violates a treaty is not automatically effective domestically.  Instead, 
section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act confers discretion 
on the U.S. Trade Representative, in consultation with the relevant 
federal agencies—which are, of course, accountable through the 
147 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (noting that “none of these 
treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation”); 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Absent author-
izing legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provi-
sions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly or impliedly pro-
vides a private right of action.” (citing Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 
580, 598-99 (1884))). 
148 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2631 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note (2006)). 
149 Id. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 note). 
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President to the American people rather than to the WTO—to decide 
whether to implement a WTO panel or appellate body decision.150
However, a decision by the United States to defy the WTO has se-
rious external repercussions.  Most dramatically, it will lead to permis-
sion for other WTO members to impose punitive duties on U.S. 
goods.  The 2003 showdown between the United States and the 
WTO151 was a rare example of the failure of such repercussions to de-
ter U.S. defiance of its WTO obligations, and in the end, after the 
European Community threatened sanctions that would heavily affect 
swing states prior to a presidential election, the United States backed 
down.152  In nearly all other circumstances, the formal power of the 
United States not to incorporate WTO rulings into its domestic law 
counts for little.  What matters are the practical obstacles to defiance 
of the WTO, not the formal obstacles. 
This is not to say that formal automatic incorporation and formal 
irrevocability count for nothing.  Under particular constitutional pro-
visions and doctrines in any given polity, it may make a critical differ-
ence whether an Act or Treaty acceding to the suprasovereign body’s 
authority is formally irrevocable and whether laws made by the su-
prasovereign body have direct effect within that polity.  For example, 
the United States cannot, as a formal matter, irrevocably join su-
prasovereign agreements for the simple reason that a later-enacted 
statute approved by a simple majority vote in each house of Congress 
150 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 129(b)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(4) 
(2006) (providing that “[t]he Trade Representative may, after consulting with the ad-
ministering authority and the congressional committees under paragraph (3), direct 
the administering authority to implement, in whole or in part, the determination” 
made by the agency that would be consistent with the WTO mandate). 
151 In March of 2002 the United States imposed thirty-percent tariffs on certain 
imported steel products and fifteen-percent tariffs on rebar and stainless steel.  See
Proclamation No. 7529, 3 C.F.R. 15 (2003).  Several countries promptly filed a com-
plaint before the WTO and successfully argued that the steel tariffs violated WTO 
nondiscrimination provisions. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safe-
guard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/248_259_abr_e.doc. 
152 The European Community (EC), aware that the steel tariffs benefited Presi-
dent Bush in battleground states such as West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, 
threatened economic sanctions that would affect other crucial states like Florida, 
South Carolina, Washington, and North Carolina.  Just prior to the retaliation dead-
line set by the EC, President Bush ordered an end to the steel tariffs.  See Jide Nzelibe, 
The Credibility Imperative:  The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 215, 224-25 (2005); 
see also Rossella Brevetti & Christopher S. Rugaber, Bush Ends Steel Safeguard Tariffs in 
Face of Threat by EU to Retaliate, 20 INT’L TRADE REP. 2021 (2003). 
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(and signed by the President) takes precedence over an earlier-
enacted treaty.153
For present purposes, however, we can gloss over these distinctions 
and focus on irrevocability and effectiveness in practice.  Regardless of 
the form of the deal, what matters is whether the cost of revoking an 
agreement to be bound by future enactments and judgments of a su-
prasovereign body is sufficiently high that, as a practical matter, it is 
very unlikely that a polity, having entered the agreement, will back out. 
And there’s the rub.  A de facto irrevocable decision by Polity A to 
enter into a suprasovereign agreement to be bound by the future en-
actments and judgments of some suprasovereign body poses roughly 
the same threat to democratic values in Polity A as a formally irrevo-
cable decision to do the same.  In either case, important policy deci-
sions will be made by actors that are not accountable to the citizens of 
A, and if the citizens of A are unhappy about those decisions, there is 
little they can do about them.  Thus, formalism provides a false solu-
tion because formal revocability without actual revocability does not 
mitigate the antidemocratic impact of dynamic incorporation of for-
eign law. 
Representation is a better, and more common, solution.  Consider 
the situation of the states of the United States in 1787 or, more re-
cently, the original member states of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) in 1957 or the EU member states when the Maastricht 
Treaty came into effect in 1993.  A state entering into one of these un-
ions gave up some of its regulatory power by agreeing to accept the 
larger body’s law in exchange for the reciprocal benefits of union.  
But in partial compensation for the resulting loss of local democratic 
control, the member states received political representation in the 
larger political entity. 
Representation in the larger entity does not perfectly substitute 
for the lost regulatory autonomy, of course.  The larger denominator 
associated with a larger political entity dilutes the votes of citizens of 
Polity A.  If this effect is sufficiently large, citizens of a small polity may 
demand special protections to prevent their interests from being 
completely overrun by those of their more populous neighbors.  Rep-
resentation of each state by two members in the U.S. Senate, and the 
assignment to each EU member state of one seat in the European 
Commission, compromise the principle of “one person, one vote” at 
153 E.g., Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683 (1912) (“Of course an act of Congress 
may repeal a prior treaty as well as it may repeal a prior act.”). 
2008] Dynamic Incorporation 157
the higher political level in order to preserve some measure of self-
governance at the lower political level.  Whether such arrangements 
provide sufficient representation at the suprastate level to offset the 
loss of democratic accountability at the state level cannot be answered 
in the abstract.  But, where the benefits of the interstate agreement 
are substantial, representation could be enough to tip the balance.  
Certainly that was the judgment of the states that joined the United 
States and of those that joined the EEC and later the EU. 
Representation in the suprastate body need not be the only safe-
guard for states that give up some self-rule for the benefits of mutual 
coordination, but it will often be essential for the enforcement of the 
other safeguards.  Here, the U.S. experience is especially instructive.  
Perhaps the single most important protection for self-rule at the state 
level is the allocation of powers among the federal and state govern-
ments.  Certainly that was the belief of the original Constitution’s 
most prominent defenders.154  Yet from very early in the Republic, it 
became apparent that there would be few, if any, judicially enforce-
able limits on the subject-matter competence of Congress.155  Notwith-
standing periodic judicial efforts to rein in the scope of congressional 
power,156 with the growth of the national economy, the judicially en-
forceable limits have come to play at best a marginal role.157  Today, 
154 As James Madison explained, “the State governments could have little to ap-
prehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the 
nature of things, be advantageously administered.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 295 
( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-
93 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are 
to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”). 
155 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (“[The power to regu-
late commerce,] like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed 
in the constitution.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) 
(“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib-
ited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”). 
156 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding the Federal Gun-
Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because it extended beyond Congress’s Com-
merce Clause power); Hammer v. Dagenhart (Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251, 277 
(1918) (invalidating a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods pro-
duced by child labor), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941). 
157 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding a federal statute that pro-
hibits possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana as applied to a person grow-
ing marijuana, under state license, strictly within California for medical purposes). 
158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 103
only one Justice of the Supreme Court argues for any serious restric-
tion.158
Nonetheless, Congress is not in fact omnipotent because the “po-
litical safeguards of federalism”—that is, the role of the states and 
their citizens voting on a state-by-state basis in the selection of federal 
officeholders—give Congress a reason not to push its power to the full 
extent that the courts would permit.  Viewing the United States as a 
suprastate body whose law (by virtue of the Supremacy Clause) is ir-
revocably159 and dynamically incorporated into the laws of the several 
states, we can regard the various mechanisms by which the states are 
represented in the federal government160 as mechanisms for keeping 
the latter within its appropriate bounds, and thus as counterweights to 
the democratic loss suffered by the states as a consequence of the dy-
namic incorporation.  More broadly, representation can serve this 
function whenever a state dynamically incorporates the law of a su-
prastate body. 
B.  Representative Courts? 
In principle, a polity can dynamically incorporate future legal 
rules and standards regardless of whether those rules and standards 
are enacted by a legislature, promulgated by an executive agency, or 
expressed in the judgment of a court.  This section focuses on the 
special concerns raised by using “political safeguards” to limit democ-
racy losses when the incorporated rules or standards come from 
courts. 
Dynamic incorporation of judicial decisions will sometimes be 
deemed a necessary element of a regime of multilateral upward in-
corporation.  The state parties to a multilateral agreement will often 
deem it useful to submit disputes concerning the meaning of provi-
sions of the mutually incorporated law to an adjudicatory body cre-
158 See id. at 58 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for a restrictive view whereby the 
Commerce Clause only “empowers Congress to regulate the buying and selling of 
goods and services trafficked across state lines”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-602 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (arguing that current Commerce Clause jurisprudence is “far removed 
from both the Constitution and from our early case law,” and advocating a more re-
strictive interpretation). 
159 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) (describing the Union as 
“perpetual” and “indissoluble”). 
160 See Wechsler, supra note 127, at 543-44 (invoking the role of states in compos-
ing and selecting federal government offices as one of the chief political safeguards of 
federalism).
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ated by that very agreement.  Whether such an adjudicatory body acts 
as a court of first instance or an appellate court, and whether it acts 
directly on private parties or requires state parties to espouse the 
claims of its citizens, the reason for a separate, supranational body will 
usually be the same:  the contracting state parties do not trust the do-
mestic courts of the respective signatories to provide impartial justice. 
Nonetheless, the mere existence of a supranational adjudicatory 
body does not, as a formal logical matter, require dynamic incorpora-
tion of supranational (for our purposes, “foreign”) law.  If the adjudi-
catory body resolves cases but does not set precedents, then its judg-
ments are not, in a formal sense, “law” to be incorporated.  Although 
Anglo-American lawyers and scholars tend to regard the precedent-
setting feature of adjudication as an essential guarantee of procedural 
regularity,161 civil law jurisdictions have long functioned without a 
formal notion of precedent.  Accordingly, a regime of upward-
incorporated statutory and administrative law could be devised in 
which the supranational adjudicatory body did not make law that the 
member states would have to incorporate. 
Yet many close observers have long taken the view that, as a func-
tional rather than a formal matter, civil law jurisdictions do have a doc-
trine of precedent.162  The proliferation in recent years of trans-
European and other international courts that publish their judgments 
accompanied by lengthy opinions in the “American” style—and that 
adjudicate cases for both common law and civil law countries—only 
further erodes the notion that high-profile adjudication can proceed 
without a functional notion of precedent. 
Moreover, even if it is possible to establish a system of adjudication 
without precedent, it will often make policy sense to require that 
161 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred 
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development 
of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual 
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 30 (1995) (“If the Constitution 
predominates because it is law, its interpretation must be constrained by the values of 
the rule of law, which means that courts must construe it through a process of reason-
ing that is replicable, that remains fairly stable, and that is consistently applied.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
162 MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 36-38 (1986) 
(“While formally free to disregard legal opinions of their superiors, judges continued 
to look to high courts for guidance.”); PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW 39 (1986) 
(“The status of jurisprudence as law is informally recognized in that reference to pre-
vious decisions containing interpretations of the law is made during the course of legal 
argument, and may be found in notes and commentaries made about the code.”). 
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judgments of a suprastate court be given precedential effect.  Suppose 
one thinks that, ceteris paribus, the best way to settle disputes arising 
under a supranational legal regime is for a supranational adjudicatory 
body to resolve the question retrospectively for past cases, but for an 
interstate legislative or administrative body to adopt new rules and 
standards specifically addressing and resolving the disputed question 
prospectively.  Even then, the adjudicatory body will be “making law” 
for past cases, and the same sorts of dysfunctions that create “grid-
lock” and “ossification” in domestic legislative and regulatory proc-
esses may operate at the supranational level.163  Thus, the adjudicatory 
body’s decision may end up establishing law prospectively as well for 
some considerable period of time. 
Accordingly, we have reason to take seriously the possibility of a 
regime of irrevocable or nearly irrevocable upward dynamic incorpo-
ration of supranational judicial lawmaking.  Is such a regime a threat 
to democratic values?  That depends on how one understands the ju-
dicial process. 
If one is committed to a strong conception of formalism, then ju-
dicial lawmaking is pure usurpation.  Courts never legitimately make 
law; all they do is apply preexisting legal norms.  Because there will 
sometimes be disagreements about how to apply those preexisting 
norms and because uniform interpretation has value, there may be 
sound reasons to prefer a system of supranational adjudication in 
which final interpretive authority resides in a single supranational 
court.  There is, however, no reason in principle why the suprana-
tional court will do a better or worse job of reaching correct interpre-
tations than would individual national courts.  So long as the judges of 
the supranational court are highly qualified legal technicians acting in 
good faith, there will be no judicial lawmaking and thus no threat to 
democratic values within the states that comprise the supranational 
regime.  Under this type of hyperformalism, the notion that individual 
judges “represent” the states from which they hail would be a deeply 
problematic solution to the problem of dynamic incorporation.  But 
happily for the hyperformalist, there is no problem in the first place 
because there is no law to be made. 
163 See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE 
GRIDLOCK 4-10 (2003) (finding bicameral differences, partisan polarization, and a dis-
appearing political center to be significant causes of gridlock); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (discuss-
ing causes of, and potential solutions to, the problem of regulatory “ossification”). 
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For different reasons, neither is there a serious problem for the 
imaginary hyperformalist’s equally imaginary antithesis, the hyperreal-
ist.  If one accepts the extreme legal-realist view that courts decide 
cases no differently from political actors, then there is no reason in 
principle to deny that representation can serve the same function with 
respect to dynamic incorporation of judicial lawmaking as it can serve 
with respect to dynamic incorporation of legislative and administrative 
lawmaking—namely, it can mitigate the antidemocratic impact. 
But what if one is neither a thoroughgoing formalist nor a thor-
oughgoing realist?  What if, in other words, one thinks that law, while 
not completely independent of politics, is not simply reducible to 
politics either?  In that case, one is likely to think that courts do le-
gitimately make law in resolving hard cases, but also that there is 
something problematic about the idea that judges “represent” con-
stituencies in deciding among potential rules and standards. 
To see whether we can fashion an acceptable role for representa-
tion in supranational judicial lawmaking, it will be helpful to consider 
how representation functions in related adjudicatory contexts.  Arbi-
tration provides a stark example.  In both private and public arbitra-
tion, it is common for the interested parties each to name one or 
more arbitrators, with one or more “neutral” arbitrators to be selected 
by a different means—commonly by the consent of the party-chosen 
arbitrators.164  Although arbitrators, once chosen, are supposed to de-
cide cases fairly,165 the very selection mechanism underscores the 
widespread understanding that party-chosen arbitrators represent, or 
at least are likely to be sympathetic to, the parties that have chosen 
them.  This understanding is reinforced by, and in turn reinforces, 
two key procedural dimensions to most arbitration:  the law as such is 
less binding on decisions of arbitrators than it is on decisions of 
courts, and decisions of arbitrators do not have the same precedential 
force as decisions of courts.166
164 See Stef Shipping Corp. v. Norris Grain Co., 209 F. Supp. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962) (describing a typical tripartite arbitration agreement “where each party to a dis-
pute is given the right to select an arbitrator and the third member is selected by them 
or by a disinterested party”). 
165 AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Canon I.D. 
(2004) (“Arbitrators should conduct themselves in a way that is fair to all parties and 
should not be swayed by outside pressure, public clamor, and fear of criticism or self-
interest.”). 
166 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (noting 
that arbitrators have no obligation to follow precedent); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbi-
tration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 402-
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Suppose, however, that for the sorts of reasons just described, the 
state parties to a multistate agreement do wish to submit disputes aris-
ing under the agreement (or laws made pursuant thereto) to adjudica-
tion that is more “law-like,” that is, to adjudication in which the judges 
regard themselves as impartial and in which decisions in concrete 
cases establish rules and standards of decision for other cases.  Might 
there still be a role for “representation” as a means of pulling the an-
tidemocratic sting from dynamic incorporation of judge-made law? 
Before considering that question, we might wonder whether there 
really is any such sting when it comes to judicial lawmaking.  After all, 
even within a single domestic legal system, courts do not decide ques-
tions of law “democratically.”  This is especially true when courts exer-
cise the countermajoritarian power to invalidate legislative decisions 
on constitutional grounds.  Even when exercising the ordinary power 
of statutory interpretation, courts do not typically act in an especially 
democratic fashion.  If, for example, the test for determining what 
some act of Congress means is one that looks to the plain meaning of 
the words, the context of enactment, and the legislative history, we 
ordinarily think that unelected judges can do as good a job of applying 
this test as elected judges.  Indeed, concerns about the possibility of 
corruption (due to the expense of judicial elections and the concomi-
tant imperative of raising funds from potential parties) incline us to 
think that unelected and thus disinterested judges will do a more faithful 
job of applying that test than judges who represent any constituency. 
The difficulty with this line of argument, however, is that it rests 
on a highly formalist premise that, by hypothesis, anyone who thinks 
there is a real problem here will have already rejected.  To recognize 
what we might call “the partial autonomy of law”167 from politics is not 
to concede the formalist claim that the background, training, and val-
ues of judges make no difference at all in the resolution of concrete 
cases or in judicial lawmaking.  The politicians and interest groups 
who treat each Supreme Court nomination as a high-stakes political 
event rightly understand that such matters contribute to a “judicial 
philosophy,” and that judicial philosophy matters.168
03 (1999) (describing the nonbinding, generally confidential, and private nature of 
arbitration decisions). 
167 MICHAEL C. DORF, NO LITMUS TEST: LAW VERSUS POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY, at xix (2006). 
168 For an excellent account of what constitutes a judicial philosophy and how it 
figures in Supreme Court decision making, see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT 
JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS ch. 6 (2007).  Eis-
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To be sure, someone who knows and agrees with a judge’s judicial 
philosophy is not exactly “represented” by that judge.  Perhaps, how-
ever, supranational judicial lawmaking does not require anything 
quite so strong as representation in order to serve the same function 
as representation does in the context of supranational legislative and 
administrative lawmaking.  That function might be better described as 
something like “values alignment.” 
Domestically, when Presidents, senators, and the interested public 
seek judges and Justices who share their values, they do not (if acting 
in good faith) seek judges and Justices who will literally take orders.  
Indeed, even an elected representative—according to Edmund Burke, 
for example—does not simply take instruction from his constitu-
ents.169  But the distance is greater for a judge than for a legislator.  
We think it laudable when a legislator listens to the concerns of her 
constituents or, in running for office, explains what policies she pro-
poses to pursue.  Supreme Court nominees, by contrast, pointedly re-
fuse to answer questions that even hint at how they will vote, if con-
firmed.  Much of this, of course, is a self-serving pose—what Senator 
Joseph Biden aptly called a “Kabuki dance”170—because a prospective 
Justice could say a great deal more than recent nominees have said, 
while still promising to keep an open mind to new arguments if con-
firmed.  The fact that Justices do not take this approach has more to 
do with nomination and confirmation politics than with judicial eth-
ics.171
Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine anyone seriously maintaining 
that judicial nominees should make campaign promises in the same 
gruber describes a judicial philosophy as the sum of a judge’s “ideological convictions” 
and “procedural convictions, including . . . convictions about the proper role of courts 
within the American political system.”  Id. at 99. 
169 Burke believed that a representative should exercise his best judgment about 
the public interest, even if that means disappointing his constituents.  See Edmund 
Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol on Being Elected (Nov. 1774), in THE POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND BURKE 108, 110 (Iain Hampsher-Monk ed., 1987).  He 
successfully ran for Parliament and put these principles into practice, whereupon he 
was voted out of office.  ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 464 (1930). 
170 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 328 (2005) [here-
inafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
171 Christopher Eisgruber argues that confirmation hearings are most likely to be 
acrimonious, and thus that nominees are most likely to try to hide their views, when 
Presidents nominate ideological extremists rather than moderates.  See EISGRUBER, su-
pra note 168,  ch. 7. 
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way that candidates for legislative or executive office do.  If judges 
“represent” particular viewpoints within a domestic legal system (or at 
least within the one domestic legal system with which I am most famil-
iar) only in the limited sense that citizens have a right to demand that 
their senators only confirm judges who broadly share their values and 
hold a judicial philosophy they deem acceptable, then the appropriate 
question for supranational lawmaking courts is whether they can be 
made representative in roughly the same way. 
The answer to that question is probably yes.  Today, Presidents 
rarely pay much attention to the state or region from which a prospec-
tive Supreme Court nominee hails, except perhaps as a means of pla-
cating a particular senator or as a proxy for particular values (to the 
extent that “red-state, blue-state” divisions translate into judicial phi-
losophy).  By contrast, ideology and (sometimes) membership in a 
particular racial or ethnic group play substantial roles in presidential 
nomination and Senate confirmation.  In previous eras, however, 
when political cleavages closely tracked geographic lines, political ac-
tors paid close attention to issues of state and regional balance on the 
Court.172  Although no one thought that a southern Justice was legally 
or even morally bound to represent southern interests on questions 
involving slavery in quite the way that southern state delegations to 
Congress did, it was understood that geographical origin shaped out-
look.
Likewise, if we look at prominent international judicial bodies to-
day, we find that membership criteria pay exquisite attention to the 
geographic area from which judges are selected.  For example, the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations, “may not include more than one na-
tional of the same State.  Moreover, the Court as a whole must repre-
sent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of 
the world.”173  The formula is even more rigid for the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg.  Although “[j]udges sit on 
the Court in their individual capacity and do not represent any 
172 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 3 (new & 
rev. ed. 1999) (including “geographic” representation in a list of various representative 
factors considered in judicial appointments). 
173 Int’l Court of Justice, Members of the Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/ 
index.php?p1=1&p2=2 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
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State,”174 the total number of judges equals the number of members of 
the Council of Europe,175 with each Council member having the right 
to put forward names for one seat on the court.176
The greater diversity of viewpoints likely to be found in a global 
organization relative to a national one (or, in a federal system, the 
greater viewpoint diversity to be found at the national level than at the 
state level) makes it more difficult for an international (or national) 
court to achieve rough viewpoint representativeness than for a na-
tional (or state) court to achieve such representativeness.  Simply as a 
practical matter, for a court to function collegially requires some rela-
tively small number of judges—nine, eleven, or perhaps fifteen, but 
not substantially larger—or what amounts to the same thing:  a prac-
tice of hearing cases in panels rather than in plenum. 
This practical limit in turn means that many member states of a 
large supranational judicial system will have to settle for virtual repre-
sentation.  For example, Nicaragua and Colombia count on judges 
from Venezuela and Mexico to represent, if not necessarily their in-
terests, at least their way of understanding their legal obligations.  In-
deed, given that the ICJ’s jurisdiction includes the resolution of terri-
torial disputes, 177 which are most likely to arise between nations in the 
same region, it should be clear that regional representation is keyed 
not to representation of interests but to understanding of perspective. 
But if member states of a multistate court must settle for virtual 
representation, it is not clear that constituencies do much better un-
der the selection systems in place for national courts.  The United 
States has perhaps the world’s most highly politicized process for 
choosing the judges of its constitutional court, and one would think 
that the system would therefore routinely produce moderate Justices 
broadly in tune with national values.  In fact, however, depending on 
the happenstance of Senate control and a President’s commitment to 
change through the courts, a small difference in elections can result 
174 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVI-
TIES: 2007, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/themes/cedh/ 
1-2248184-Survey_of_activities.pdf. 
175 See id. (“The Court is composed of a number of judges equal to that of the 
Contracting States (currently forty-five).” (footnote omitted)).  There are actually 
forty-seven members, but Ireland and Montenegro’s seats are currently vacant.  See id.
at 5 n.6. 
176 For a list of members as of December 31, 2007, see id. at 8. 
177 See, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), 2007 I.C.J. 124 
(Dec. 13), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/14305.pdf (accepting 
jurisdiction over a territorial dispute). 
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in substantial philosophical differences among the Justices that are 
confirmed under different administrations.  In a supranational system 
in which judicial seats are apportioned roughly one to a country or 
region, one can at least count on one judge with a broadly sympa-
thetic perspective, and norms of neutrality and collegiality may then 
give that judge substantial influence.  Thus, the virtual representation 
for which many nations must settle in the selection of judges for su-
pranational courts may do a better job of reflecting the interests and 
outlooks of the member nations than a more political, and thus more 
directly representative, system would do. 
To be clear, the principal example of “representation” on supra-
national judicial bodies I have used here—the ICJ—does not issue 
judgments that are automatically or irrevocably incorporated into the 
domestic law of UN member states.  Thus, for example, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon that ICJ rulings inter-
preting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were entitled to 
“respectful consideration,” but were not binding on the Supreme 
Court, which went on to disagree (respectfully) with the ICJ’s conclu-
sions.178  Meanwhile, even before the Court’s decision in Sanchez-
Llamas, the State Department had given notice that it would prospec-
tively withdraw from the Vienna Convention’s Optional Protocol, 
which had invoked the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in the first 
place.179
If representation of member states among the judges of a supra-
national judicial body is thought to be a necessary expedient when the 
supranational judicial body’s judgments lack the automatic force of 
law within the member states, such representation would seem to be 
especially necessary where the supranational court’s judgments have 
greater force.  Whether such representation is a sufficient condition to 
compensate for the loss of domestic judicial authority is a different 
question, but the answer is probably yes.  Representation on courts ac-
complishes less than representation in legislative and administrative 
bodies.  At the same time, however, delegating judicial decisions to a 
supranational court poses less of a threat to domestic democracy be-
cause judicial decision making itself is not best understood as a de-
mocratic process.  Thus, to compensate for irrevocable or nearly ir-
revocable dynamic incorporation of judge-made law, judicial 
178 548 U.S. 331, 355-58 (2006). 
179 See id. at 339. 
2008] Dynamic Incorporation 167
representation can succeed despite accomplishing less than legislative 
or administrative representation. 
Before concluding this Part, it is worth noting an argument that is 
not available to justify nearly irrevocable dynamic incorporation of 
judge-made law.  In a recent article, Henry Monaghan argues that su-
pranational judicial review does not violate U.S. constitutional 
norms.180  Monaghan’s best arguments are historical.  The United 
States, he contends, has submitted to supranational adjudication since 
the early days of the Republic.181  Monaghan also advances a func-
tional argument, however.  Supranational adjudication, he argues, is 
small potatoes compared to supranational legislation.  As to the latter, 
he concedes that “[i]ssues of national sovereignty and democratic ac-
countability are surely raised by this increasingly widespread practice.  
But that bell having been rung, it cannot be unrung.”182  In other 
words, because the United States has acquiesced in the sovereignty-
threatening practice of supranational legislation, it is too late to worry 
about the lesser threat posed to national sovereignty by supranational 
adjudication. 
However, this line of argument is unavailable here because, as 
Monaghan’s examples themselves reveal, he conceptualizes suprana-
tional adjudication as a form of arbitration or other dispute-resolution 
mechanism that does not create law.  Indeed, he is careful to distin-
guish these mechanisms not from legislation as such, but from the 
broader category of “lawmaking.”183  Presumably, supranational judi-
cial lawmaking poses the same serious threat to national sovereignty as 
other forms of supranational lawmaking.184
To be sure, Monaghan also thinks that even these more serious 
threats have been accepted as the price of participation in the global 
180 See generally Monaghan, supra note 3. 
181 See id. at 851-66 (detailing how the United States has entered international 
agreements creating state-state arbitration panels to resolve the private law claims of its 
nationals against foreign governments, sometimes leading to a reexamination of deci-
sions of the Supreme Court itself). 
182 Id. at 882. 
183 See id. at 881-82. 
184 Like almost everything else, the question of whether a supranational tribunal 
makes law will not always be amenable to a yes-or-no answer.  The decisions of tribu-
nals that, in theory, only resolve disputes between parties may have varying degrees of 
precedential effect in practice.  Cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree:  In-
ternational Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2034 (2004) (describing the 
NAFTA Chapter 11 review process and offering “dialectical review” as an intermediate 
option between nonbinding “dialogue” among national and supranational tribunals 
and strictly binding judicial review). 
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order.  I am less certain on this point, perhaps because I am less per-
suaded than he that one of the safeguards that he regards as crucial 
still exists—“the ultimate prerogative of the political branches to 
withdraw from any supranational institution.”185  As a formal matter, 
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution does ensure that, ab-
sent constitutional amendment, the political branches do retain that 
ultimate prerogative.  Yet, as I argued in the previous section, those 
who are concerned about sovereignty should be concerned principally 
about whether the delegation of lawmaking power is functionally 
revocable, and not merely about whether it is formally revocable.186
Thus, supranational judicial lawmaking and other forms of supra-
national lawmaking pursuant to functionally irrevocable grants of 
power do pose threats to sovereignty.  Whether those threats rise to 
the level of constitutional violations in the United States or any other 
country is not my main concern here.  Rather, as I have endeavored to 
show throughout this Part, the functional irrevocability of a delegation 
to a supranational lawmaking body—whether that body is nominally 
legislative, administrative, or judicial—calls for safeguards to mitigate 
the effect on democratic values.  Where the delegation is otherwise 
sensible, representation in the supranational lawmaking bodies them-
selves is the most natural such safeguard, and though one needs to 
stretch the notion of “representation” somewhat to accommodate ju-
dicial lawmaking, given the other differences between judicial and 
nonjudicial lawmaking, the solution works reasonably well for judicial 
lawmaking also. 
CONCLUSION
In recent years, much judicial, legislative, and academic attention 
has been paid to the question of whether it is appropriate for U.S. 
courts to cite foreign law as guidance in interpreting U.S. law.187
185 Monaghan, supra note 3, at 882. 
186 Supra Part IV.A. 
187 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 note (“No foreign 
or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of 
the United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in [18 U.S.C. § 2441(d), 
the War Crimes Act].”); Confirmation Hearing, supra note 170, at 25 (statement of Sen. 
Mike DeWine, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Many are troubled when they 
see the Court cite international law in its decisions . . . .”).  Compare Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight 
of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . .”), and id. at 604-05 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging some role for international law in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence because “this Nation’s evolving understanding of human 
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Much of the criticism of this practice misses the mark, for those who 
favor it never contend that foreign judgments should be treated as 
binding precedents.188  But if misapplied as a criticism of citation prac-
tices, the points made in opposition to the invocation of foreign law 
have greater force in circumstances in which the law of one jurisdic-
tion dynamically incorporates the law of another jurisdiction.  Regard-
less of whether that other jurisdiction contains, is contained within, or 
is wholly outside of the incorporating jurisdiction, the act of incorpo-
ration cedes some measure of political accountability to actors an-
swerable to a different polity.  This practice can sometimes be justified 
by the benefits it confers, and the concerns it raises can be mitigated 
by a variety of procedural mechanisms, but the concerns cannot sim-
ply be dismissed. 
dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values 
prevailing in other countries”), with id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic 
premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of 
the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”).  For an argument for “the 
emergence of a transnational law . . . that merges the national and the international,” 
see Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 53 
(2004).  For an argument that “[f]oreign and international law cannot be legitimately 
used in an outcome-determinative way to decide questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion,” see Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 291, 296 (2005). 
188 Justice Kennedy stated for the Court in Roper v. Simmons that foreign experi-
ence merely confirmed the conclusions that he and his colleagues would have other-
wise reached independently:  “The opinion of the world community, while not control-
ling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”  543 U.S. at 578. 
